

Customer Success Is Our Mission



#### **IEEE Joint Section Reliability Chapter monthly meeting**

[Boston - New Hampshire - Providence]



# MISSION: A WORLD OF INNOVATION

# Counterfeit Analysis-

**Detection & Quality Control Non-Conformance Issues** 

# **Prevention-**

Hardware & Data Destruction,
Assured Domestic
Electronics Recycling

#### Aaron DerMarderosian Jr.

Principal Electrical Engineer
Raytheon Company

#### Morgan Deptola

Quality Control & Inventory Manager TCG Components



## Outline- Supply Chain Issues & Case Studies

- ➤ Background & History Regarding Counterfeit
- ➤ Industry Issues & Awareness
- Existing Standards- Overview
- ► Issues- Detection, Analysis & Interpretation
- ➤ Supply Chain & Raytheon Case Examples
- Example Report- Suspect Counterfeit
- Conclusions & Recommendations- Standards, Training, Reporting



# **Background & History**

- Prior domestic counterfeit issues: (Incidence rate in-frequent) Crude re-marks, lot reject scavenging, marked mechanical samples
- 2. **Current Global counterfeits:** (Above plus re-claimed scrap & clones) Sophisticated refurbish & remarking techniques. Increase in incident / detection rate Matriculation throughout the supply chain Effects: Brokers, ID's, OEM's, AD's Even OCMs!
- 3. U.S. Counterfeit Ring Investigation: IC counterfeits, MVP Micro & VisionTech highlighted how serious this issue is 2003: Reported to DOJ by an OCM, ICE investigation initiated **04-12:** Investigation; Warrants; Indictments; Convictions; Sentencing, **8 yr.** timeframe 10s to 100s of thousands counterfeit ICs sold prior & during the investigation!
- SASC Hearings Nov. 2011: Levin-McCain listen to witness testimony Representation: MDA, GAO, SIA, Independent Distributors & OEMs
- 5. NDAA 2011 - 2013: Counterfeit laws passed, 2014 edits & DFARS pending



# **Industry Issues & Awareness**

- 6. Domestic Transition to EU RoHS & WEEE: Implemented mid-2006
  Non-uniform OCM adoption- Part marking & numbering conventions not standardized
  Added complexity & confusion to the supply chain- Particularly 05-07 timeframe
  Reclamation requirements- Provided an endless supply of high value legacy components!
- 7. Conferences & Workshops: Counterfeit theme raises industry awareness Components for Military & Space Electronics: CMSE (CTI)

  U. Maryland Joint with SMTA: Calce Counterfeit Symposium (East & West)

  ERAI Executive Conference: Theme dedicated to counterfeits (ERAI)

  U. Conn ARO / CHASE Workshop on Counterfeits

  Counterfeit Component Awareness Workshop, CCAW (CTI)

  MDA Workshops- Counterfeit Materiel Training (Supports PMAP)

  Diminishing Manufacturing Sources & Material Shortages Conference (WG, supports DoD)
- 8. Industry Standards Generation:
  SAE, IDEA & iNEMI, also TechAmerica, ECA, IEC & GIFAS
  Standards released or pending. Several require updates & CB criteria!
- 9. Industry, DoD & Government awareness: Dramatic increase since 2011 Highlights analysis, interpretation disparities & knowledge gaps within the electronics industry

Laws & Requirements precede standards adoption & awareness

### **Policies & Standards-**

# **Raytheon**Integrated Defense Systems

#### Targeting Counterfeit Components, Materials

#### Counterfeit Products Risk Mitigation and Prevention: Raytheon

**243-RP:** Corp. Policy includes procurement, controls, supplier requirements, based on **AS 5553A** (7.24.12)

**SP-345:** IDS procedure, References RTN policy & **IDEA-STD-1010**, articulates BU needs (12.15.11)

# IDEA: "Acceptability of Electronic Components Distributed in the Open Market" IDEA-STD-1010B Released April 2011- Independent Distributors of Electronics Association

Visual & surface inspection of electronic components traded in the open market

#### IDEA: IDEA-1005-D "IDEA Inspection process guideline checklist"

- <u>Decommissioned</u> updated checklist, chapter 16 (p. 244-245) IDEA-STD-1010B
- Best practice Industry process sheet & visual inspection guide, provides a generic framework
- Comprehensive, assumes users are trained in inspection techniques, procedures & knows how to tailor to applicable work instructions

#### SAE: "Counterfeit Electronic Parts; Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition"

AS 5553A Released Jan 2013- SAE International (Society of Automotive & Aerospace Engineering)

- Policies / requirements flow down, to sub-tier organizations that procure electronic parts
- Utilized by Aerospace / Defense OEM Integrators, Contains RTN policy elements

OEMs & Supply Chain: Authorized, Franchised, Independent Distribution

## **Standards & Programs-**Counterfeit Components & Materials



SAE: "Counterfeit Electronic Parts: Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation & Disposition"

AS 6081: Released November 2012- Mandatory practices for Independent Distributors, Implementation in process

AS 6171: Initial draft pending- Testing & Analysis Methods, applies to Failure Analysis Labs. in review

AS 6174: Released May 2012- Parts and Materials Initial draft, released

#### Component Technology Institute: "Counterfeit Component Avoidance Program" CTI-CCAP-101 Established in 2008, now in Revision D

- Mandatory practices for Independent Distributors
- Detection / avoidance of acquisition & delivery of counterfeit electronic components

#### **Inspection Certifications & Training:**


**IDEA-ICE-3000-** Inspector Certification Pre-requisites, IDEA training & Inspection experience Counterfeit Component Avoidance Workshop (CTI)- 2 day hands on event hosted in a FA lab **NASA JPL-** Beginner to advanced workshops, offered at Industry conferences **IDEA-STD-1010B-** Offered through IDEA / IPC certified training centers (IE: EpTac)

MDA Workshops- Counterfeit materiel training, provided to DoD suppliers

# **Inspection Guidelines-**

# **Raytheon**Integrated Defense Systems

IDEA-STD-1010B {ch. 16} Used by permission from IDEA www.idofea.org



[Formerly IDEA-1005-D] Assumes user knows how to implement



### **ISSUES-** Detection, Analysis & Interpretation

- > Industry awareness of counterfeits subject components to heightened scrutiny
- > Standards provide requirements, procedures, analysis techniques & generalized examples of compliant & suspect devices
- > Analysis / Inspection data interpretation guidance & how to perform investigation, is **NOT** provided!
- > Training & certification for counterfeit inspection not required
- > Counterfeit inspection techniques are NEW for many in the industry
- > OCM quality non-conformances, misinterpreted as "suspect" counterfeit issues
- > Packaging & component construction knowledge, REQUIRED to interpret results
- > Analysis & data requirements in "Industry" consortia databases, are NOT well established. Many entries lack documentation / evidence to indict parts
- > Parts categorized as "suspect" require analytical tests to determine if it is counterfeit, cost <u>prohibitive</u> to most organizations

Follow on examples Illustrate some of these issues

# Supply Chain Case Studies Counterfeit Test Detection & Interpretation Issues



# **Supply Chain Case Example 1-**

#### Raytheon

#### **Integrated Defense Systems**

#### High volume flash memory; Training Issue

- Parts contained in OCM packaging. Labeling, Component finish / quality consistent with OCM
- Visual Inspection & surface tests executed per 1010B: for Authenticity (06 week 42)
  - 1. Barcode readout, verify component info. 2. Inspect mold cavities
  - 3. Dimensions per datasheet 4. Verify OCM markings, P1 location
  - 5. Top / Bottom surface Match 6. Marking Permanency
  - 7. Surface Test (Blacktopping) 8. No reported ERAI Instances
  - 9. Date code verified with supplemental EOL information
- Customer noted mold mark opposite Pin1 was textured, claimed part was re-surfaced, *lot rejected*
- Surface test in-correctly executed, results misinterpreted
- P1 mark is always smooth, alternate mold marks can be textured!
- Enhanced optical / textured images
   Revealed acetone and excess
   Burnishing smoothed part surface
- Enhanced digital imaging highlights black top evidence. <u>NONE</u> present















Training, test execution & Interpretation leads to false Indictments!

# **Supply Chain Case Example 2-**

#### Raytheon

**Integrated Defense Systems** 

High volume flash memory; Database Issue, RoHS Interpretation

LH28F160S5HT-L70

 OCM packaging & consistent component finish, pass 1010B QC inspection. No report history in ERAI database

 Customer questioned date code (06 week 32), ERAI database reports a LTB of 12/31/04.
 Incorrect info. entered in IHS —

 OCM responds with PCN / EOL LTB date of <u>8/31/06</u>, last ship date <u>11/30/06</u> {builds continue 6-12 months after LTB}

 Customer part number search indicates product is Tin/Lead, box states "Lead Free"

 RoHS transition year- Some OCMs DID NOT change part numbers or add LF markings

 OCM did not respond to tech. support LF request. Customer accepted part on risk, verified parts were "Lead free" via XRF



LEAD FREE

Industry is looking at ICs with a lot of scrutiny & are risk adverse!


# **Supply Chain Case Example 3-**

#### Raytheon


**Integrated Defense Systems** 

8 Bit Micro-controller; Font Disparity, OCM QC Issues

- IC Packaging with varied component finish, pass 1010B QC inspection (08 week 28) IC's construction consistent with OCM QC
- No ERAI reports or EOL notice (still in production) = Lower Risk
- Acquired from manufacturer, purchased directly from OCM's AD
- Issues discovered in inspection: Varied
   COO mark by date codes, faded P1 indicator
- No evidence of tampering / blacktop (Passes Surface Tests)
- Enhanced imaging suggests QC process issue at OCM: Part marking requiring surface re-work OR injection Mold issue <u>NOT</u> effecting functionality
- COO font disparity likely related to supplier Injection mold differences (factory supplier location)
- OCM ICs may have QC non-conformances, that can be indicted as counterfeit!



Consistent Surface






# **Supply Chain Case Example 4-**


**Integrated Defense Systems** 3 Mb , 256K, 12 bit Field Memory ; Training, Construction Knowledge

- OCM packaging & consistent component finish, pass 1010B QC inspection
- Component packaging pristine, copper NOT present on the lead ends
- Inspection training includes verifying presence copper, lead frame (LF) formation marks, OCM cut striations Evident
- LF can come in other metals, IE Kovar (iron Alloy) vs. Sn / Ni / Cu, LF base metal not identified on datasheet
- XRF or SEM-edx could verify lead materials
- For low quantity sales, **cost** of analytical testing can exceed the lot value!
- Rules of thumb do NOT always apply
- **Engineering judgment & further** investigation required to verify authenticity











No evidence of blacktopping

Datasheet / App. note review & contacting the OCM may be required

# Raytheon Case Example-

#### Raytheon

**Integrated Defense Systems** 

Fixed Delay Line, Data I/O; Training, Construction Knowledge

- Components provided to FA lab as "suspect counterfeit"
   Failing during CCA assembly- Leads de-wetting from the board
   Components indicted as "suspect"- Based on appearance due to counterfeit awareness
- Component construction typical of specialized components:
  - > Fixed Digital Delay Lines (DDLs) > Time Delay Units (TDUs)
- Supplier makes timing devices based on customer's circuit design application
  - Wired & assembled using manual assembly "commercial best practices"
  - Substrate cap is epoxy potted, following assembly
  - Surface sanding marks part of assembly process
  - Part markings & surface finish consistent with manually assembled specialty components

#### **Analysis Revealed:**

- Component in-correctly indicted initially as "Counterfeit"
- Supplier Issue, SEM-EDS showed intermetallic formation under the Tin/Lead plate
- Observations of parts from Stores, lead plating procedures at supplier required review
- Leads could be reworked to meet production needs
- DDD Inc. needed to be contacted, determine if replacement stock is available


Supplier Issue indicted as counterfeit based on cursory knowledge

# Raytheon Case Example-

#### Raytheon

**Integrated Defense Systems** 

Fixed Delay Line, Data I/O; Sanding Marks, Poor Construction & Print Quality




Top & Side View: All dimensions & lead formation meet print

# Raytheon Case Example-

#### Raytheon

**Integrated Defense Systems** 

Fixed Delay Line, Data I/O; Components from Stores provided



Side View: overall, 45 Degree 3D depth up, Purged Devices

# **Example Database Report-**

#### Raytheon **Integrated Defense Systems**

#### **Category: Suspect Counterfeit**

#### Part: FM93C56M8

Part Number:

FM93C56

Manufacturer: Date Code:

22

Lot Code: B22XX

Country of

Origin:

Suspect

Counterfeit:

Date Reported: 08/28/2013

#### **Description of Nonconformance:**

Parts were represented as new and unused, however the following nonconformities were observed during inspecti

- 1. Parts failed resistance to solvents (RTS) testing.
- 2. Parts failed scrape test.
- 3. Obvious visual evidence of ghost markings.

#### Available Images and Test/Nonconformance Reports:

















- Ghost markings, WELL known practice for 2 Major OCMs who remarked components to downgrade & sell off production excess to Rochester Electronics, Landsdale, etc. at EOL
- Some OCMs do NOT control markings or conform to QC finish requirements
- Report submitted inaccurate, incorrect category & missing information!



Reporting entity should check with resellers, Ads & OCMs; Gather background information

# **Summary, Recommendations-**

# **Raytheon**Integrated Defense Systems

#### Analysis, Training & Reporting

- ➤ Industry requirements and procedures define inspection techniques but do not provide guidance on interpretation
- Supply chain knowledge / experience gaps exist on execution of visual and surface inspection analysis techniques
- ➤ Interpretation is subjective, requires working knowledge of IC supplier assembly / packaging construction, OCM markings & finish quality levels. Quality can vary significantly by supplier!
- ➤ Training should include: Analysis interpretation & investigation techniques; Component construction methods; Examples of IC supplier quality issues
- Minimum reporting guidelines for analysis, supporting images & documentation, Required to improve data collection & reporting
- ➤ Reporting databases NEED a new category: "Lessons learned" or "Exceptions to the Rule"

DoD and Industry established standards & procedures require optimization

# Integrated System Product Life Cycle Secure Hardware & Data Destruction





#### Outline- Secure Hardware & Data Destruction


- Systems Product Life Cycle Process (PLCP)- Issues & Concerns with retired electronics proliferation
- ➤ Quality Management Systems- Overview of ISO-14000 & R2 / RIOS
- Security Policies- Facilities & Personnel
- Overview Hardware Destruction- Shredder Process, Raw Material Reclamation
- ➤ Overview Data Destruction (MIL-STD vs. NIST)- Data storage devices, Destruction & Recycling
- ➤ Other Services- Assured Destruction, Refurbishment, Equivalency Reports
- Conclusions & Recommendations



#### PLCP- Overview

#### **Diagram:** Integrated System Product Life Cycle Process

- Systems within DoD & Aerospace have service life requirements that span decades
- Aging equipment is iteratively upgraded to integrate additional capabilities & take advantage of advances in electronic IC's & components



#### Raytheon

#### **Integrated Defense Systems**

## System PLCP- DoD / Aerospace life cycle issues

#### **Issues:** Integrated System Product Life Cycle Modernized Defense, Weapon & Aerospace systems contain high value ICs in electronics packaging which meet system environmental requirements Processors, Memory, Micro-controllers, FPGAs, Mil-Grade specialty components ■ Large percentage of components (>80%) are commercial grade! and returned to the supply chain to be re-sold as new? ☐ Presents SERIOUS system, reliability, readiness (up time) & security concerns ■ DoD, MDA & DHS share concerns regarding electronics technology export, IP Infringement (technology matriculation), sensitive data containment & IC re-use through E-Waste exports ■ Procedures ARE in place to ensure Classified & Critical Information is destroyed. Collateral system level hardware & data containment needs to be addressed ☐ Retired / Failed hardware that contain high value legacy electronics MUST be disposed of in accordance with all EHS regulations (Federal, State & local) ☐ Certified domestic companies provide specialized services to address these concerns

PLC 5 – 7 generate valuable E-waste, domestic services can address this!

# **Environmental Standards-** *ISO 14000 Overview*

# **Raytheon**Integrated Defense Systems

- ➤ ISO 14001:2004 Environmental quality management standard Assures proper handling, disposal & reclamation of materials
  - Applicable to organizations that want to establish, implement, maintain & improve an environmental management system. Assures & demonstrates conformity within stated environmental policies
  - Requirements to develop / implement an Environment Management System& Policy
  - Includes legal & other requirements to which the organization subscribes & information about significant environmental aspects
  - Applies to environmental traits that the organization identifies, which it can control & influence, does not state specific environmental performance criteria
  - Certification & registration conformance performed by an accredited CB, conformance includes customer and other interested party audits (Federal/state/local agencies)
  - Annex A- provides informative guidance on it's use & Implementation



# **Environmental Standards-**R2/RIOS Overview



- ➤ RIOS:2006 Recycling Industry Operating Standard
  - Similar to ISO 9001 Quality Management System (QMS)
  - For recycling companies that want to establish a Quality & Environmental, Health & Safety (QEHS) management system
  - Responsible / secure material de-construction and recycling
  - Requires Independent certification & on-site audits
- >R2 (R2:2008) Electronics Recycling Operating Standard
  - Specific facility certification for responsible electronics product recycling
  - •Includes a broad consortia of electronics recyclers & the Environmental Protection Agency
  - Currently there are 432 Certified E-recyclers
  - Updated R2:2013 includes additional requirements on proper handling of components, traceability & security
  - Consortia Members (Including TCG) working towards updated Compliance requirements in R2:2013, anticipated adoption in 2014





Establishes a Certified QMS to address proper handling of E-waste

#### Ravtheon

#### **Integrated Defense Systems**

# Security Requirements- ITAR Registered Company

#### Security & Containment: Personnel & Facilities, ALL

- Employees subject to drug & background checks (7 years- Federal/State/Local)
- Required to use electronic access badges {maintains control of restricted areas}
- Sites monitored with an extensive video surveillance / security system network. 90 day continuous video loop
- Premises alarmed with central security system, restricted Manager / Owner access
- •Qualified employees granted access to restricted material areas:
  - Data Destruction- Biometric restricted access, Limited / cleared employees
  - ✓ Components side- At risk "suspect" components, Locked QC manager access only
- High security fences, Metal detectors in entrance / exit of all facilities






Clearances & controlled limited access ESSENTIAL for containment!

#### Secured Destruction- Hardware

➤ Industrial Shredder: Multi-Stage Separation / Reclamation process

Crush & Shred- 2 Stage Multi-Tine electro-hydraulic roll pins

4 stage Gross Material Separation- Metals / Plastics / Styrene's



- Reclaimed Base, precious metals & plastic, applied to rebate or payout to customer
- •Hardware, data / disk & memory devices can be marked for destruction regardless of condition, Based on customer requirements

**Initial Shred** 

Shredder Facility @ TCG





Example, Material Separation



Hardware & Data bearing devices destroyed at customer request

### Secured Destruction- Hardware

Industrial Shredder: 4 stage Separation- Base / Precious Metals, Plastics, Styrene's & other (non-recyclables)

Stage 4 **Final Sort** 





Automated Industrial shredder, Sorts & bins de-constructed materials



#### Secured Destruction- Data

► Disk Drives (Storage): Data ERASED; drives recycled or <u>destroyed</u>

Data security / destruction exceeds federal information protection acts

(Multi Write-Clear operations)

Area Biometric Access: (authorized personnel only)
 Limited / Restricted access

- Multiple Hard Drive Interfaces:
   SATA, IDE, SCSI, ESDI, UDMA, Fibre Channel, USB
- Data destruction to NIST STD 800-88 (TCG is a NAID member)
   [National Association for Information Destruction]
  - Requires Write / Clear operations on all drive data bits 7 Times VS. outdated MIL-STD which requires 3
  - Longer cycle time BUT assures destruction of ALL critical data!
  - ldeal for proprietary, sensitive, company information
- Does NOT include <u>Classified & CPI/CI</u> storage assets. Handled in accordance with OEM / DoD requirements



#### Raytheon

#### Integrated Defense Systems

### Secured Destruction- Data & Other services

- > Memory devices (Solid state, Microcontrollers, FPGAs):
- Destroyed in accordance with secured hardware destruction procedures, based on customer requirements
- >Other Services: Electronics Refurbishment / Witnessed Destruction
  - Certificates of information Destruction: Assure assets are sanitized
  - ■Witnessed on-site or remote destruction: Based on Customer requirements, resources can be on-site to observe destruction or have video of procedure provided with the Destruction Certificate
  - Microsoft certified asset refurbishment: Testing / refurbishment requirements imposed. Option to resell/reuse assets for material disposition return
  - **Annual / Semi-Annual equivalency reports:** Based on EPA Waste Reduction Model (WARM), EPEAT & EPA GHG calculators estimate:
    - Energy & Solid Waste Savings
    - Green House Gas reduction
    - ✓ Compliments & supports corporate "Green" initiatives



# **Conclusion & Recommendations**

- ✓ Containment & Secure destruction of system platform electronics ensures legacy components do not re-enter the supply chain as counterfeit devices!
- ✓ Domestic ISO-14001 R2/RIOS certified electronics recycling companies have Quality, Environmental & Security management systems in place to address the need of Secure Hardware & Data Destruction
- ✓ For secure information destruction work with a company who is a NAID member & utilizes enhanced data clear requirements NIST STD 800-88
- ✓ ITAR Registered facilities have enhanced security requirements in place
- ✓ Confirm your E-Recycler is working towards R2:2013 compliance
- ✓ Services including witnessed / remote destruction & certificates of information destruction assure end of use electronics are traceable and handled in accordance with customer needs
- ✓ Refurbishment is an option to reduce waste reclamation Costs, Work With a Certified Microsoft asset refurbishment organization
- ✓ Equivalency Reports *SUPPORT* corporate EHS "Green" Initiatives



# **Acknowledgments**

The presenter / co-author would like to thank the following from Technology Conservation Group for providing background & inputs for this presentation:

**Morgan Deptola-** (Quality Control & Inventory Manager; Components division) Peer review, security procedures / protocol, supply chain examples & supporting images

**Steve Craig-** (EHS Corporate Compliance Director) Shredding Facility & data destruction tours, review of corporate security protocol & assurance measures, RIOS / R2 & ISO-14001 overview

**Hamilton Rice-** (CEO) Knowledge sharing for industry awareness & training, facility host & tour



# **Acronyms, Definitions**

AT&L: Acquisition, Technology & Logistics; DoD undersecretary (OSD)

AD: Authorized Distributor

**BU:** Business Unit

CAT: Counterfeit Avoidance Team (Enterprise wide)

**COTS:** Commercial Off The Shelf (components, products)

**CB**: Certification Body

CPB: Customs Protection & Borders

CPI/CI: Critical Program Information / Counterintelligence

CTN: Components Technology Network (Enterprise wide)

**DFARS:** Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement

**DHS:** Department of Homeland Security

**DLA:** Defense Logistics Agency

**DLAD:** Defense Logistics Acquisition Directive **DMS:** Diminishing Manufacturing Supply (source)

**DoD:** Department of Defense (U.S.)

**DoJ**: Department of Justice (U.S.)

**ECA:** Electronics Components Association Standards

**EHS:** Environmental Health & Safety

**EOL:** End Of Life (System Refurbishment / Upgrades) **ERAI:** Electronic Resellers Association Incorporated **ETMA:** Engineering Technology & Mission Assurance

FD: Franchised Distributor

GAO: Government Accountability Office (U.S.)

**GIDEP:** Government-Industry Data Exchange Program

**GIFAS:** French Aerospace Industries Association

ICE: Immigration & Customs Enforcement

IEC: International Electrotechnical commission

IC: Integrated Circuit

**ID:** Independent Distributor

IDEA: Independent Distributors of Electronics Association

iNEMI: International Electronics Manufacturing Initiative

*Infringement:* Describes a violation of rights on intellectual property, copyright

or patent

IP: Intellectual Property, patented or trade secret body of work

ITAR: International Traffic in Arms Regulations

**KPA:** Key Process Area

Legacy: Previous generation system (Military / Aerospace)

LF: Lead Free

LMS: Learning Management System, Raytheon Training tool

LTB: Last Time Buy

MDA: Missile Defense Agency
MIL Spec: Military Specifications

**MIL-STD:** Military Standard (specifications)

NDAA: National Defense Authorization Act, Implemented Annually

NHA: Next Higher Assembly

OCM: Original Component Manufacturer

**OEM:** Original Equipment Manufacturer (Systems) **OSD:** Office of the Secretary of Defense (U.S.)

**PCN:** Product Change Notice **PLCP:** Product Life Cycle Process

**POC:** Point Of Contact

**PPP:** Program Protection Plan

**Prime:** System Design Lead / Provider

QC: Quality Control

**RESA:** Raytheon Enterprise Supplier Assessment

RoHS: Reduction of Hazardous Substances

RTN: Raytheon

SAE: Society of Automotive & Aerospace Engineering

SEM-edx: Scanning Electron Microscopy-energy dispersive x-ray spectroscopy

SASC: Senate Armed Services Committee SIA: Semiconductor Industry Association

SME: Subject Matter Expert SMT: Surface Mount Technology

Supplier: Sub-system component provider, Sub-Contractor WEEE: Waste Electrical & Electronic Equipment Directive

WG: Working Group

XRF: X-ray fluorescence