

HALT In The Product Development Process

Adam Bahret
Apex Ridge Reliability
5/11/16

YOUR LEADER IN RELIABILITY SOLUTIONS



Apex Ridge Reliability provides tailored reliability solutions that advance our customer's products in the market.

Adam Bahret

is a reliability engineer with extensive experience in program strategy, reliability analysis, accelerated testing and HALT in the fields of robotics, medical devices, consumer electronics, and heavy equipment.





"The book presents practical examples of what an engineer should and shouldn't do to be successful in developing a reliable product. It is a must read for all engineers and managers who are involved with corporate-wide improvement efforts."

James McLinn, CRE, Fellow ASQ, Manager of Reliability, Beckman-Coulter

"Mike and Adam take you on a guided tour of Design for Reliability techniques, which are interwoven with many fascinating and useful case studies that demonstrate how this approach has already benefited many organizations. They have gifted you with the tools to help make your great products better."

Mark Turner, C.R.P., Six Sigma & DFSS Black Belt

"If most people who want reliable products would execute even half of what Mike and Adam are espousing, how great it would be for consumers. Instead of going into depth on each topic, this book stays at a higher level to give a perspective of reliability within the product development lifecycle."

Harry McLean, Author of HALT, HASS, and HASA Explained: Accelerated Reliability Techniques



Mike Silverman passed away on September 13, 2014. Throughout his twenty-five-year career, he maintained a singular focus on reliability. He was the founder and managing partner of Ops A La Carte, a reliability engineering consultancy that helps customers build end-to-end reliability into their products. Mike created HALT and HASS Labs, a reliability laboratory in Northern California. A Certified Reliability Engineer, he published over a dozen technical papers and was also a former president of the Silicon Valley IEEE Reliability Society.



Adam Bahret has over twenty years of industry experience as a Design, Analysis, and Reliability Engineer. He has developed major reliability programs in fields such as Semiconductor Ion Implantation, Medical Blood Analysis, Industrial Robotics, and Diesel Systems. Adam has specialized in combining reliability analytical and design tools into product development programs, as well as developing specialized testing programs for product development and qualification. He has a Bachelor's in Mechanical Engineering and a Master's in Systems Engineering. He is a member of ASQ and IEEE, as well as a Nationally Certified Reliability Engineer (CRE).

Mike and Adam worked together for many years on collaborative initiatives and advancing reliability practices in industry through education and mentoring. In addition to their professional relationship, they were close friends who greatly enjoyed exchanges on both the philosophical and practical aspects of engineering while mountain hiking or skiing. One can only conclude that they believed altitude was a catalyst for discovery.

DESIGN: PRODUCT: MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP: QUALITY CONTROL

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How Reliable your Product?

ADAM BAHRET

How Reliable is Your Product? 50 WAYS TO IMPROVE PRODUCT RELIABILITY MIKE SILVERMAN ADAM BAHRET



Definition of HALT

Highly Accelerated Life Test

HALT: Performed to ruggedize the product and obtain large margins over the expected in-use conditions. Uses all stresses which can cause relevant failures. Stresses are not limited to field levels or stresses.

-"Accelerated Reliability Engineering: HALT and HASS", Gregg Hobbs




What does HALT do?

- Quickly discovers failure modes
- Evaluates design margins
- Supports release of a mature product
- Reduction in development time and cost
- HALT is not something you pass or fail
- HALT is a tool for discovery of design characteristics




Stress Exposure and Limits





Stress Exposure and Limits





HALT Process

Stress:
Start low and step
up the stress,
testing the product
during the stressing

HALT Cycle

Failure: Gradually increase stress until a failure occurs

Improve:
Make temporary
improvements or
isolate stress from
found failure mode
and continue

Analyze: Analyze the failure to root cause as much as possible in lab



Reliability Integration-

"The Process of seamlessly cohesively integrating reliability tools together to maximize reliability and at the lowest possible cost."



Assessment Goal Setting Gap Analysis Benchmark

Metrics

Block Diagrams CONCEPT

DFMEA

FTA

Component Selection

Thermal Analysis

Derating Analysis HALT Sub-Assemby

DESIGN PHASE

DOE (Des Of Exprts)

Tolerance Analysis

Preventive Mainten.

HALT Assemby Design Func Testing Stress Strength Analysis

Life Cycle Testing

HALT System ALT (Accel Life Tst)

HALT-AFR Calculator RCA (Root Cause Anlys)

CLCA (Cls Loop corctv Actn) PROTO PHASE

Vendor Assessmt HASS
(high Acl strs scrn)

ORT (ongng Rel Test)

OOBA (out of box audit)

Warranty Strategy Field Reporting



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
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
Product Performance

What are we trying to improve?

What are the metrics for design improvement?




Bathtub Curve






Bathtub Curve Metrics






Bathtub Curve Metrics





Bathtub Curve Metrics





HALT Improving Infant Mortality

- HASS -Highly Accelerated Stress Screen
 - In HASS all product is "screened" at stress levels above operating levels are applied in order to quickly uncover process weakness, thereby reducing quality based field failures.
- HASA Highly Accelerated Stress Audit
 - In HASA only a predetermined statistically significant portion of the produced units are screened.




What does HASS do?

- Detect and correct Process changes
- Reduces production time and cost
- Increases out of box and field reliability
- Decreases field service and warranty cost
- Reduces infant mortality rate
- Finds failures not found in burn-in

-HASS can not be done without HALT




HASS Stress Range




Stress
















HALT and Improving Failure Rate

FMEA's

- Identifying areas of highest system criticality for testing focus
- Identifying non relevant failure modes

FTA

Identifying failure modes for FTA investigation

Design of Experiments (DOE)

- Identifying how to combine different stresses for HALT
- A tool for root cause analysis after HALT



Assessment

FMEA – "Failure Mode and Effects Analysis" is a methodology for understanding failure modes and identifying their impact

DFMEA

on the system

DOE (Des Of Exprts)

Life Cycle **Testing**

ID#		Part Function	Failure Mode	Effects of Failure	a)		Occur	Detect	RPN	Remarks
	downstream	input for	does indicate	over/under						Build a bench setup for downstream
248	pressure	secondary	corect pressure	infusion	5	binding	4	5	100	pressure sensor. Idnetify stresses
		input for								
	downstream	secondary								
	pressure	flow	does indicate	over/under						System Level testing will capture any
249	sensor	calculation	corect pressure	infusion	5	contamination	4	5	100	shift in accuracy over time
	downstream									
	pressure	indicate	incorrect low							physiological effects of over
233	sensor	blockage	pressure	infiltration	4	binding	4	5	80	pressurization
	248	downstream 248 pressure downstream pressure 249 sensor downstream	ID# Part Function downstream input for secondary input for downstream pressure flow 249 sensor calculation downstream pressure indicate	ID# Part Function Failure Mode downstream pressure input for secondary input for downstream pressure flow does indicate corect pressure 248 pressure secondary input for secondary flow does indicate corect pressure downstream pressure indicate incorrect low	ID# Part Function Failure Mode Failure downstream pressure secondary input for secondary pressure flow does indicate over/under infusion downstream pressure flow does indicate over/under secondary pressure flow does indicate over/under infusion downstream pressure indicate incorrect low	Part Function Failure Mode Failure Mode Description Desc	D# Part Function Failure Mode Failure Ø Failure	downstream input for secondary corect pressure infusion 5 binding 4 input for secondary pressure flow does indicate over/under secondary pressure flow does indicate corect pressure infusion 5 contamination 4 downstream pressure indicate incorrect low	downstream input for secondary corect pressure infusion 5 binding 4 5 input for downstream pressure flow does indicate over/under secondary pressure flow does indicate over/under calculation corect pressure infusion 5 contamination 4 5 downstream pressure indicate incorrect low	ID# Part Function Failure Mode Failure Ø Failure Ø E

Vendor Assessmt

HASS (high Acl strs scrn)

ORT (ongng Rel Test)

OOBA (out of box audit) Warranty **Strategy**

Field Reporting



Assessment **Goal Setting** **Gap Analysis** Benchmark Metrics

Block Diagrams

FMEA – "Failure Mode and Effects Analysis" is a methodology for understanding failure modes and identifying their impact

DFMEA

on the system omponent

Component Selection

Thermal Analysis

Derating Analysis

HALT

DESI

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Warranty Strategy Field Reporting



Assessment

Goal **Setting**

Gap **Analysis**

Metrics

FMEA – "Failure Mode and Effects Analysis" is a methodology for understanding failure modes and identifying their impact on the system omponent

DFMEA

Selection

Thermal Analysis

Analysis

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	downstream	secondary									
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HALT & DFMEA

Assessment **Goal Setting** Gap Analysis Benchmark

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Life Cycle Testing

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
Warranty Strategy Field Reporting



HALT and DFMEA

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	pressure	indicate	incorrect low							physiological effects of over
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How about using HALT in addition to the bench test?



Put accelerometer right at pressure sensor/valve location as response for binding failure mode diagnosis





HALT and DFMEA

ID#	Part	Part Function	Failure Mode	Effects of Failure	Severity	Causes of Failure	Occur	Detect	RPN	Remarks
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_	downstream	input for								
	downstrear pressure 243 sensor	n regulate pressure	incorrect high	loss of valve		4 Disconnect	/	5	68 5 100	an accuracy over time
▎┕	pressure sensor	indicate	incorrect low pressure	infiltration	4	binding	4	5		pnysiological effects of over pressurization

Increase Occurrence of "Disconnect" Cause from a 3 to 5 which brings ID 243 into the "critical evaluation zone"

Team revisits DFMEA and changes corrective/mitigative actions

Discover in HALT testing that PCB connection easily disconnects





HALT & DOE

Assessment Design of Experiments (DOE) -A method to determine the relationship between factors affecting a process and the output of that process

DFMEA

- "Cause and Effect" relationships can be statistically related
- Interactions of multiple variables driving the "Effect" can be determined
 Interactions of multiple variables driving the "Effect" can be determined

24,28,32,36,...,48

28,32,36,40,44,48

32,36,40,44,48

36,40,44,48

36-39

40-43

44-47

40.44.48

44,48

DOE (Des Of Exprts)

Life Cycle
Testing

HALT
System

Vendor
Assessmt

HASS
(high Acl strs scrn)

2-7

8-11

12-15

16-19

12,20,24,28,...,48

12,20,24,28,...,48

20,24,28,36,...,48

20,24,28,32,...,48

							Fac	tors						
Runs	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
4	Full	- 11												
8		Full	IV	- 11	- 11	10								
16			Full	٧	IV	IV	IV	- 0	Ш	III	10	- 11	- III	- 0
32				Full	VI	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
64					Full	VI	٧	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV
128						Full	VIII	VI	٧	٧	IV	IV	IV	IV

20-23

24-27

28-31

32-35

Field Reporting

MANUF



HALT & DOE


Available Factorial Designs (with Resolution)

							Fac	tors			Factors													
Runs	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15										
4	Full	- 11																						
8		Full	IV	Ш	- 11	III																		
16			Full	V	IV	IV	IV	- 0	III	- 10	- 0	- 11	III.	- 11										
32				Full	VI	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV										
64					Full	VI	٧	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV	IV										
128						Full	VIII	VI	٧	٧	IV	IV	IV	IV										

Available Resolution III Plackett-Burman Designs

Factors	Runs	Factors	Runs	Factors	Runs
2-7	12,20,24,28,,48	20-23	24,28,32,36,,48	36-39	40,44,4
8-11	12,20,24,28,,48	24-27	28,32,36,40,44,48	40-43	44,48
12-15	20,24,28,36,,48	28-31	32,36,40,44,48	44-47	48
16-10	20 24 29 32 49	32.35	36 40 44 49		

Create response results that show a clear link of inputs and outputs for the experiment




Discoveries in HALT assist with selection of the critical matrix factors

Conclusive surface response

What's the hardest part of setting up a DOE?

Selecting the most critical Factors and Levels

Multiple Simultaneous Frequency







HALT & FTA

Assessment Goal Setting Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive approach for resolving an undesired event into its causes

FMEA


FTA

- FTA is a top down failure analysis, looking back to the causes of a given event
- Specific logic symbols are used to to illustrate the event relationships

DOE (Des Of Exprts)

Life Cycle Testing


Vendor Assessmt





HALT & FTA


- HALT will expose failure modes that can be the subject of an FTA
- The stresses in HALT can be considered in the FTA structure






HALT & FTA

- An FTA may not be able to completed with high confidence without experimentation
- HALT can very quickly identify relationships between stresses and failure modes






Bathtub Curve Metrics






Bathtub Curve Metrics





Bathtub Curve Metrics






Product Development Process

- Accelerated Life Test (ALT) Is the process of determining the reliability of a product in a short period of time by accelerating the use environment
- Common Models
 - F— Coffin Manson
 - Arrhenius
 - Power Weibull

DOE (Des Of Exprts Tolerance Analysis



HALT Sub-Assemby


Stress Strength Analysis DESIGN

Life Cycle Testing HALT System ALT (Accel Life Test)

Vendor Assessmt

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



HALT & ALT

Coffin Manson accelerated life model

Uses increases temperature range cycling to demonstrate useful

life in a shorter time period







Arrhenius acceleration life model

Uses elevated temperature to demonstrate useful life in a shorter

time period





Adam Bahret




- HALT yields a high number of failure types in a short time period
- This offers the opportunity to begin to investigate and classify failure types far in advance of their discovery in other test methods

When doing a root cause analysis for any type of test the most important distinction is it a wear-out failure or stress failure?




 In a Reliability Growth program it is critical that only stress related failures are included in demonstrating the failure rate






 Wearout failures are grouped into normal distributions and dictate when the product should be removed from the population so it's "old age" doesn't pull down field performance







 If wear-out failures can't be distinguished from stress failures the demonstrated product failure rate in an RG program will be artificially low and the goal can not be demonstrated






















Bathtub Curve After HALT







Thank You

Questions?