

# SWITCHING TRANSIENTS INDUCED TRANSFORMER FAILURES

Presented to  
IEEE-IAS – Atlanta Chapter  
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By David Shipp, PE

## Case Study Overview: Data Center Transformer Failure Attributed to Circuit Breaker Induced Switching Transients

System Configuration, Failure Analysis  
and RC Snubber Fix

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D. Shipp – Eaton Electrical – Pgh, PA


## Presentation Purpose/Summary

- **Purpose #1 Safety:**
  - Alert Design & User Community
  - Drive Solutions Through Market Interest
- **Unique Case History**
  - Forensic Evidence
  - High Speed Power Quality Capture
- **Presentation Summary**
  - Simplified System Overview
  - Forensic Review
  - Power Quality Snapshots
  - Installed RC Snubber Fix
- **Presentation Summary: David Shipp, Eaton**
  - Phenomenon Detailed Explanation
  - Science of RC Snubber Design

## Site Specifics

- **Utility Service:**
  - 26kV
  - Double Ended Loop Through
- **Transformers**
  - (6) Total
  - 26kV Primary, 480V Secondary
  - VPI
  - 3000kVA AA / 3990 kVA FA
  - 150 kV/bil
- **Switching Device**
  - Vacuum Circuit Breaker
- **Cable**
  - 35kV, 133% EPR Insulation, 1/3 Concentric Ground


## Simplified System Configuration




## Failure/Sequence of Events

- **All Transformers Fully Tested:**
  - Pre-functional: Turns Ratio, Insulation Resistance, etc
  - Functional: UPS Full Load Tests, UPS Transient Tests, Data Center Room Validation Testing
- **Final Pull The Plug Test (PTP)**
  - 4 Electricians "simultaneously" open (4) 26KV vacuum breakers to simulate a general utility outage.
    - All systems successfully transfer to standby generation but:
      - Loud Pop heard in Substation Room B
      - Relay for VCB feeding TB3 signaling trip
    - Decision made to shutdown generator test and investigate issue in "B" substation room
  - 2 Electricians "simultaneously" close (2) 26KV vacuum breakers to Substation Room "A"
    - Transformer TA3 fails catastrophically.


# Pre-PTP Condition




# Failure #1: De-Energization During PTP



## Failure #2: Energization During PTP




## Failure #2 Transformer Failure On Energization



Coil to Coil Tap  
Burnt Off


## Failure #2 Transformer Failure On Energization



Suspected Area  
of Initial Flash


Coil to Coil Conductor  
Burnt Off

## Failure #2 Transformer Failure On Energization




Coil to Coil Tap  
Burnt Off


## Failure #2 Transformer Failure On Energization



## Failure #1 Transformer Failure On De-Energization



# Failure #1 Transformer Failure On De-Energization



Close up of  
Flash/Burn Marks

Coil to Coil not  
Winding to Winding

**This Transformer was Returned  
to the Factory and Passed all  
Standard IEEE Tests!**

# Failure #1 Transformer Failure On De-Energization




15KV Cable  
In 26KV  
Transformer

No Coil to Coil  
Cable Supports


Some Burn  
Marks Match  
Point of  
Cable Contact




## Failure #1 Transformer Failure On De-Energization




## Unaffected Transformer



## Current Transient: Failure #2 Transformer Energization



## Current Transient: Failure #1 Transformer DeEnergization



## Breaker Induced Switching Transients

### **Case 1** **Hydro Dam, MT 2005**

- MV Vac Bkr Replacements Vendor "A"
- 13.8 kV
- 20 feet of cable
- 50 kV BIL (W) ASL Dry Type Txmrs
- Customer Energized before Vendor OK
- Txmr Failed
- No Surge Protection Applied

**CASE 2**  
**Cleveland Hospital 3/06**

- Vacuum Breakers – Vendor “A” and Vendor “C”
- 13.8 kV
- 95 kV BIL
- Dry Type Txmr
- 27 feet of Cable
- Bkr Manufacturer Paid to Repair Failed 2500 KVA Txmr
- Surge Protection Added Afterwards

**CASE 3**  
**RAILROAD SUBSTATION 11/06**

- Vacuum Breaker – Vendor “A”
- 26.4 kV
- 150 kV BIL
- Generic Liquid Filled Rectifier Txmr
- 37 feet of Cable

**CASE 4**  
**NJ DATA CENTER 12/06**

- 26.4 kV – Vendor “B”
- 4 Txmrs Switched Under Light Load
- 2 Txmrs Failed-1 on Closing/1 on Opening
- 40 Feet of Cable
- 2 other Txmrs Did Not Fail - 80 Feet of Cable
- Arresters Were Present

**CASE 5**  
**OIL FIELD – AFRICA 6/07**

- Vacuum Breaker – Vendor “D”
- 33 kV
- 7 Feet of Cable
- Dry Type Txmr in 36 Pulse VSD
- Arresters Were Applied
- Txmr Failed Upon Energization

**CASE 9**  
**Oil Drilling Ship – 6/2002**

- Vendor “A” IEC Vac Bkrs in Vendor “D” Swgr
- 11kV, 60 HZ
- Cast Coil Dry Type IEC VSD Propulsion Txmr Failed (7500 kVA) – 75 kV BIL?
- < 30 feet of Cable
- Fed from Alternate Bus – Now 80 feet of Cable
- No further Failures Reported

**Case 10**  
**Ferry – NY City – Feb 2010**

- 4.16 KV System
- Vendor A – IEC BKR
- 15 Feet of Cable
- IEC Cast Coil Txmr – 30 kV BIL
- Failed upon Closing

## SWITCHING TRANSIENTS DUE TO VACUUM / SF6 BREAKERS

- Opening -- Current Chop
- Closing -- Prestrike/Re-ignition/Voltage Escalation
- Vacuum Bkrs --Both Closing and Opening
- SF6 -- Opening
- Air -- Generally Acceptable

## Current Chop

- Vacuum Arc Burns in Metal Vapor From Contacts
- Requires High Temperature Arc Roots
- Heat Supplied by Current Flow
- As Current Goes to Zero, Metal Vapor Production Decreases
- When Metal Vapor Cannot Support the Vacuum Arc,
  - It Suddenly Chops Out



## Current Chop

### Current Chop in Vacuum is a Material Problem


- Older VIs - GE - Use Copper-Bismuth
  - GE 1st tried 5% Bi - didn't interrupt
  - Reduced Bi to 0.15% - weak welds - interrupts
  - Chop current still high like copper at up to 21 A
- Modern VIs - C-H - Use Copper-Chromium
  - Lower chop current of up to 5 A
  - Excellent Interruption performance
  - Moderate weld strength

Modern VI →  
 Older VI →

Contact Material	Average (A)	Maximum (A)
Cu	15	21
Ag	4	7
Cr	7	16
W	14	50
Cr-Cu (75 wt %)	3	5
Cr-Cu-Bi (5 wt %)	1	3
Cr-Cu-Sb (9 wt %)	4	11
Cu-Bi (0.15 wt %)	6	21
WC-Ag (50 wt %)	1.5	2.5
W-Cu (30 wt %)	5	10
Co-Ag-Se	0.4	0.8
Cu-Bi-Pb	1	9

## Current Chop

- All Types of Interrupters Chop Current
- This is not a Unique Feature of Vacuum






## Switching Inductive Circuits

- Closing
- Opening
- Voltage Escalation
- Surge Suppression


## Switching Inductive Loads CLOSING

- Travelling wave in cable reflects & doubles at load
- All Interrupter Technologies (Vacuum, SF6, Air, Oil) Have Similar Effect




## Switching Inductive Loads OPENING

- If a restrike occurs on opening, a high frequency current flows with current zeros



## Switching Inductive Loads VOLTAGE ESCALATION

- Repetitive re-ignition can occur when contacts part just before a current zero & interrupt at high frequency zeros
- Voltage builds up & breaks down several times before interrupting



## SWITCHING TRANSIENT THEORY

- “Thou Shalt Not Change Current Instantaneously in an Inductor”
- Conservation of Energy –
  - You Cannot Create or destroy Energy –
  - You Can Only Change Its Form

## ENERGY EQUATION

$$\frac{1}{2}LI^2 = \frac{1}{2}CV^2$$

OR

$$V = I\sqrt{\frac{L}{C}}$$

## TOTAL VOLTAGE

- $V_t = V_{energy} + V_{dc} + V_{osc}$
- $V_{energy}$  is from the Energy Equation
- $V_{dc}$  = DC Off-set that Sometimes is Present
- $V_{osc}$  = the Oscillatory Ring Wave

## TRANSFORMER LIMITS


- Magnitude – BIL Ratings
- $Dv/dt$  Limits
- Both MUST Be Met
- Dry Type Txmrs Particularly Susceptable
- Liquid Filled Not Immune.
- Consider “Hammer Effect”

## ANALYSIS


- When Open Bkr, Txmr is Left Ungrounded
- Ring Wave is a Function of its Natural Frequency

$$NF = \frac{1}{2\pi\sqrt{LC}}$$


## CASE 3 Waveforms Without Snubbers



### CASE 3 Current – Without Snubbers



### CASE 3 Waveforms With Snubbers




## CASE 4

### Data Center 12/06

- 26.4 kV
- Vendor "B" Breakers
- 4 Bkrs Switched at Once
- 2 Dry Type Txmrs Failed (40 Ft of Cable)
- 2 Txmrs Did not Fail (80 Ft of Cable)
- Unfaulted Txmr Winding Failed BIL @162 kV ( Rated 150 kV)


## CASE 4

### Data Center, NJ 12/06 - W/O Snubbers



## CASE 4

### Data Center, NJ 12/06-With Snubbers




## CASE 6

### Data Center 2, NJ 12/06


- 13.2 kV
- Vendor “B” Breakers
- 3 MVA Dry Type Txmrs
- 60 ft Cable – Required Snubbers
- 157 ft Cable – Required Snubbers
- No Problem at Startup



**CASE 6**  
**13.2 kV SYSTEM – 119 kV @ 678 HZ**



**CASE 6**  
**WITH SNUBBERS – 33.6 kV @ 236 HZ**




## CASE 7

### Chemical Plant, NC 3/07

- 12.47 kV System
- 20+ Year Old Oil Filled Txmrs
- Vendor "A" Vacuum Bkrs retrofitted on Primary
- 10 Feet of Cable
- No Problem at Startup


## CASE 7

### 425 kV - 12.47 kV - 23 kHz Ring Wave



## CASE 7

### Added Snubbers – 12.47 kV




## CASE 8


### DATA CENTER – Indiana 6/07

- 12.47 kV System
- Vendor “A” Breakers
- 270 Feet of Cable
- No Additional Surge Protection Required


## CASE 8 -55 kV at 800 HZ




## Case 10 Closing Measurements




## Case 10 Closing 20.2 kHz




## Case 10 Closing - Snubbers



## Case 10 Opening – 31 kV



## Case 10 With Snubbers-31kV to 9 kV @299HZ



## MITIGATING TECHNIQUES

- Arresters
- Surge Capacitors
- Snubbers (RC)
- Hybrid / Combinations
- Liquid vs Dry Type
- Electronic Zero Crossing Switching

### Snubber - 3 Phase Capacitor Generally Solidly Grounded System

- Paper Mill - AL
- 13.8 kV



## Snubbers – 2<sup>nd</sup> paper mill - beta site



## Snubber – Single Phase Capacitors Low Resistance Grounded Systems

- Paper Mill
- Vendor "A" Swgr
- 13.8 kV






## Snubber – Single Phase Capacitors


- Silicon “Chip” Plant
- Montana
- Very Specialized Dry Type Txmrs
- 13.8 kV
- Cables < 100 feet
- Primary Fused Switch AF Solution
- Vendor “A” Vac Bkrs




## RC Snubber Installed – Case 4



## RC Snubber Installed – Case 4



## RC Snubber Installed – Case 4



## **SWITCHING TRANSIENT STUDY**

- Quantifies Problem
- Predict Exposure / Risk
- Select Best / Most Cost Effective Solution
- Do “What if” Cases
- Verify Results

## **RECOMMENDATIONS**

- Factor into Design Up-front
- Do Study – Results Are Bkr Manufacturer Specific
- Use Protection Only When / Where Needed (if not there, cannot fail)
- Fused or Unfused Snubbers??
- Loss of Fuse Detection??
- Fear Not! - Mitigating Techniques Have Been Proven.
- Discrete Snubber Components??

## Conclusion/Next Steps

- **This is a System Problem**
  - Transformer, Cable, Switching Device, Proximity
  - Statistical Event , Possible Undetected Failures
- **Data Centers Fall into the Highest Risk Category**
  - High Power Density
  - Close Proximities
  - Frequent Switching
- **Draft IEEE C57.142**
  - A Guide To Describe The Occurrence and Mitigation Of Switching Transients Induced By Transformer And Switching Device Interaction
  - Does not accurately warn users of all areas of concern
  - This case did not meet the areas of concern noted in Draft C57.142
  - Need to push for formalization of the standard with new lessons learned
- **RC Snubbers**
  - Transformer Manufacturer appears best positioned to implement the solution
  - Limited Cataloged Product (One Manufacturer)
  - Not embraced by all transformer manufacturers
  - Design Parameters of RC Snubber not clearly defined
- **Lives, Property and Uptime are all at risk**

**QUESTIONS ?**

