

Cooperation and Competition in Multi-user Wireless Networks

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multiuser wireless networks: Motivations

Licence-free frequency band

- Deal with the inter-user interference.
- Low transmit power.

How can we increase the transmission rate?

- Cognitive radio: dynamically exploit the available radio frequency spectrum in order to efficiently avoiding interference.
- Cooperation between transmitter/receiver nodes or with additional relay nodes.

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Cognitive radio

Goal

Dynamically exploit the available radio frequency spectrum in order to efficiently avoid interference.

Remarks

- Resource allocation game between users.
- Making use of tools from game theory.

Cooperative channels

Major information-theoretic works: [Cover and El Gamal, 1979]

- Useful to assess the benefits of cooperation in terms of communication rate (standard relay channel).
- They introduced two major relaying strategies: **decode-and-forward** and **estimate-and-forward**.
- **The relaying strategy is a key point for the cooperation between users.**

The Return of Cooperative Channels

MIMO channels

[Telatar, 1995 and 1999], [Foschini, 1996 and 1998]: Information-theoretic analysis of MIMO systems (**diversity gain, multiplexing gain**) → Increase communication rate.

Virtual MIMO

[Sendonaris et al., 1998 and 2003]: The benefits (rate, diversity) of MIMO systems can be obtained in a distributive manner in wireless networks.

Objectives of user cooperation

- Increase the range of wireless communications or the the communication rate.
- Increase the reliability of communications in fading environnements.

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
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
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Objectives: Cooperative multi-user system + MultiMultiband radio

- Generalization of Cover and El Gamal's results.
- Introduction of a theoretic approach in a decentralized context.




- Multiband radio with Q non-overlapping frequency bands.
- Selfish users maximizing their individual transmission rate.
- Power Allocation Game.




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Outline of the talk

- 1 Shannon theory for the interference relay channel
 - Background and goal
 - The discrete case
 - The Gaussian case with only private messages
- 2 Power allocation Games in multiband IRCs
 - Background
 - System model
 - Equilibrium analysis for some relaying protocols
- 3 Conclusion and perspectives

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Cooperation for multiuser channels

- Multiple access relay channel (MARC): [Sankaranarayanan et al., 2003]
- Broadcast relay channel (BRC): [Liang et al., 2007], [Kramer, 2005]

Interference channel

- Capacity region known for the special case of strong interference: [Carleial, 1975], [Sato, 1978]
- Best inner bound by [Han and Kobayashi, 1981]: rate-splitting + time-sharing.

Interference relay channel (IRC)

- Introduced by [Sahin and Erkip, 2007]: rate region for the Gaussian case with a DF-based strategy.
- Results of [Maric & al, 2008]: DF and interference forwarding.

Our contributions

- Treat both discrete and Gaussian cases.
- Coding theorems based on several strategies (DF and EF).
- Two approaches for the EF-based strategy: Bi-level and single-level compressions.
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
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Rate-splitting ([Carleial, 1978]) at each source node

- (W_{10}, W_{11}) at S_1 and (W_{20}, W_{22}) at S_2 .
- D_1 decodes the triplet (W_{10}, W_{11}, W_{20}) and $R_1 = R_{10} + R_{11}$.
- D_2 decodes the triplet (W_{10}, W_{20}, W_{22}) and $R_2 = R_{20} + R_{22}$.



Theorem (DF-based strategy)

For the DMIRC $(\mathcal{X}_1 \times \mathcal{X}_2 \times \mathcal{X}_r, p(y_1, y_2, y_r | x_1, x_2, x_r), \mathcal{Y}_1 \times \mathcal{Y}_2 \times \mathcal{Y}_r)$ with both private and common messages, any rate quadruplet $(R_{10}, R_{11}, R_{20}, R_{22})$ satisfying

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}} R_i \leq I(V_{\mathcal{I}}; Y_r | U_S, X_r, V_{\mathcal{I}^C}) \quad \text{for all } \mathcal{I} \subseteq S = \{10, 11, 20, 22\},$$


$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_1} R_i \leq I(U_{\mathcal{I}_1}, V_{\mathcal{I}_1}; Y_1 | U_{\mathcal{I}_1^C}, V_{\mathcal{I}_1^C}) \quad \text{for all } \mathcal{I}_1 \subseteq S_1 = \{10, 11, 20\},$$

$$\sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_2} R_i \leq I(U_{\mathcal{I}_2}, V_{\mathcal{I}_2}; Y_2 | U_{\mathcal{I}_2^C}, V_{\mathcal{I}_2^C}) \quad \text{for all } \mathcal{I}_2 \subseteq S_2 = \{20, 22, 10\},$$

for some joint distribution $p(u_{10})p(v_{10}|u_{10})p(u_{11})p(v_{11}|u_{11})p(x_1|v_{10}, v_{11})p(u_{20})p(v_{20}|u_{20})p(u_{22})p(v_{22}|u_{22}) \times p(x_2|v_{20}, v_{22})p(x_r|u_{10}, u_{11}, u_{20}, u_{22})$, is achievable, where \mathcal{I}^C , \mathcal{I}_1^C and \mathcal{I}_2^C and the complements of \mathcal{I} , \mathcal{I}_1 and \mathcal{I}_2 respectively in S , S_1 and S_2 . We have $V_{\mathcal{I}} = \{V_j, j \in \mathcal{I}\}$.

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
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Bi-level compression feature

The relay increases interference at each receiver node.

Theorem (EF-based strategy: Bi-level resolution compression)

For the DMIRC $(\mathcal{X}_1 \times \mathcal{X}_2 \times \mathcal{X}_r, p(y_1, y_2, y_r | x_1, x_2, x_r), \mathcal{Y}_1 \times \mathcal{Y}_2 \times \mathcal{Y}_r)$ with both private and common messages, the rate quadruplet $(R_{10}, R_{11}, R_{20}, R_{22})$ is achievable, where

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
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
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Single-level compression feature

The estimation noise level is lower bounded by the worse receiver node.

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
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System model



power constraints: $\mathbb{E}|X_1|^2 \leq P_1$, $\mathbb{E}|X_2|^2 \leq P_2$ and $\mathbb{E}|X_r|^2 \leq P_r$.

Corollary (DF-based strategy – Sahin & Erkip, 2008)

When DF is assumed, the following region is achievable:

$$\begin{aligned}
 R_1 &\leq \min \left\{ C \left(\frac{|h_{1r}|^2(1-\tau_1)P_1}{N_r} \right), C \left(\frac{|h_{11}|^2P_1 + |h_{r1}|^2\nu_1P_r + 2\Re e(h_{11}h_{r1}^*)\sqrt{\tau_1P_1\nu_1P_r}}{|h_{21}|^2P_2 + |h_{r1}|^2\nu_2P_r + 2\Re e(h_{21}h_{r1}^*)\sqrt{\tau_2P_2\nu_2P_r + N_1}} \right) \right\} \\
 R_2 &\leq \min \left\{ C \left(\frac{|h_{2r}|^2(1-\tau_2)P_2}{N_r} \right), C \left(\frac{|h_{22}|^2P_2 + |h_{r2}|^2\nu_2P_r + 2\Re e(h_{22}h_{r2}^*)\sqrt{\tau_2P_2\nu_2P_r}}{|h_{12}|^2P_1 + |h_{r2}|^2\nu_1P_r + 2\Re e(h_{12}h_{r2}^*)\sqrt{\tau_1P_1\nu_1P_r + N_2}} \right) \right\} \\
 R_1 + R_2 &\leq C \left(\frac{|h_{1r}|^2(1-\tau_1)P_1 + |h_{2r}|^2(1-\tau_2)P_2}{N_r} \right),
 \end{aligned}$$

where $(\nu_1, \nu_2) \in [0, 1]^2$ s.t. $\nu_1 + \nu_2 \leq 1$ and $(\tau_1, \tau_2) \in [0, 1]^2$.

Corollary (EF strategy: Bi-level resolution compression with only private messages)

For the Gaussian IRC with only private messages and with the bi-level resolution estimate-and-forward strategy, the rate pair (R_{11}, R_{22}) is achievable, where

$$\textcircled{1} \text{ if } C\left(\frac{|h_{r1}|^2 \nu_2 P_r}{|h_{11}|^2 P_1 + |h_{21}|^2 P_2 + |h_{r1}|^2 \nu_1 P_r + N_1}\right) \geq C\left(\frac{|h_{r2}|^2 \nu_2 P_r}{|h_{22}|^2 P_2 + |h_{12}|^2 P_1 + |h_{r2}|^2 \nu_1 P_r + N_2}\right),$$

we have

$$R_{11} \leq C\left(\frac{|h_{11}|^2 P_1}{N_1 + \frac{|h_{21}|^2 P_2 (N_r + N_{wz}^{(1)})}{|h_{2r}|^2 P_2 + N_r + N_{wz}^{(1)}}} + \frac{|h_{1r}|^2 P_1}{N_r + N_{wz}^{(1)} + \frac{|h_{2r}|^2 P_2 N_1}{|h_{21}|^2 P_2 + N_1}}\right),$$

$$R_{22} \leq C\left(\frac{|h_{22}|^2 P_2}{N_2 + |h_{r2}|^2 \nu_1 P_r + \frac{|h_{12}|^2 P_1 (N_r + N_{wz}^{(2)})}{|h_{1r}|^2 P_1 + N_r + N_{wz}^{(2)}}} + \frac{|h_{2r}|^2 P_2}{N_r + N_{wz}^{(2)} + \frac{|h_{1r}|^2 P_1 (|h_{r2}|^2 \nu_1 P_r + N_2)}{|h_{12}|^2 P_1 + |h_{r2}|^2 \nu_1 P_r + N_2}}\right),$$

subject to the constraints

$$N_{wz}^{(1)} \geq \frac{(|h_{11}|^2 P_1 + |h_{21}|^2 P_2 + N_1) A - A_1^2}{|h_{r1}|^2 \nu_1 P_r}, \quad N_{wz}^{(2)} \geq \frac{(|h_{22}|^2 P_2 + |h_{12}|^2 P_1 + |h_{r2}|^2 \nu_1 P_r + N_2) A - A_2^2}{|h_{r2}|^2 \nu_2 P_r},$$

with $(\nu_1, \nu_2) \in [0, 1]^2$, $\nu_1 + \nu_2 \leq 1$, $A = |h_{1r}|^2 P_1 + |h_{2r}|^2 P_2 + N_r$, $A_1 = 2\mathcal{R}e(h_{11} h_{1r}^*) P_1 + 2\mathcal{R}e(h_{21} h_{2r}^*) P_2$
 and $A_2 = 2\mathcal{R}e(h_{12} h_{1r}^*) P_1 + 2\mathcal{R}e(h_{22} h_{2r}^*) P_2$

The channel $\mathcal{R}-(\mathcal{D}_1, \mathcal{D}_2)$ is a Gaussian BC for which the capacity region is known.

Corollary (EF strategy: single-level resolution compression with only private messages)

For the Gaussian IRC with only private messages and with the bi-level resolution estimate-and-forward strategy, the rate pair (R_{11}, R_{22}) is achievable, where

$$R_{11} \leq C \left(\frac{|h_{11}|^2 P_1}{N_1 + \frac{|h_{21}|^2 P_2 (N_r + N_{wz})}{|h_{2r}|^2 P_2 + N_r + N_{wz}}} + \frac{|h_{1r}|^2 P_1}{N_r + N_{wz} + \frac{|h_{2r}|^2 P_2 N_2}{|h_{21}|^2 P_2 + N_1}} \right),$$

$$R_{22} \leq C \left(\frac{|h_{22}|^2 P_2}{N_2 + \frac{|h_{12}|^2 P_1 (N_r + N_{wz})}{|h_{1r}|^2 P_1 + N_r + N_{wz}}} + \frac{|h_{2r}|^2 P_2}{N_r + N_{wz} + \frac{|h_{1r}|^2 P_1 N_2}{|h_{12}|^2 P_1 + N_2}} \right),$$

subject to the constraints $N_{wz} \geq \frac{\max\{\sigma_1^2, \sigma_2^2\}}{2^{2R_0} - 1}$ with

$$R_0 = \min \left\{ C \left(\frac{|h_{r1}|^2 P_r}{|h_{11}|^2 P_1 + |h_{21}|^2 P_2 + N_1} \right), C \left(\frac{|h_{r2}|^2 P_r}{|h_{22}|^2 P_2 + |h_{12}|^2 P_1 + N_2} \right) \right\},$$

$$\sigma_1^2 = |h_{1r}|^2 P_1 + |h_{2r}|^2 P_2 + N_r - \frac{(2\mathcal{R}e(h_{11} h_{1r}^*) P_1 + 2\mathcal{R}e(h_{21} h_{2r}^*) P_2)^2}{|h_{11}|^2 P_1 + |h_{21}|^2 P_1 + N_1}$$

$$\sigma_2^2 = |h_{1r}|^2 P_1 + |h_{2r}|^2 P_2 + N_r - \frac{(2\mathcal{R}e(h_{22} h_{2r}^*) P_2 + 2\mathcal{R}e(h_{12} h_{1r}^*) P_1)^2}{|h_{22}|^2 P_2 + |h_{12}|^2 P_1 + N_2}$$

Single-level compression vs Bi-level compression

	Single-level compression	Bi-level compression
Maximize the system sum-rate with low receiver SNRs asymmetry	×	
Maximize the rate at the "best" receiver with high received SNRs asymmetry		×
Maximize the rate at each receiver node with low receiver SNRs asymmetry	×	
Maximize the system sum-rate with high receiver SNRs asymmetry		×

Zero-delay scalar amplify-and-forward

Theorem (Transmission rate region for the IRC with ZDSAF)

Let R_i , $i \in \{1, 2\}$, be the transmission rate for the source node S_i . When ZDSAF is assumed the following region is achievable:

$$\forall i \in \{1, 2\}, R_i \leq C \left(\frac{|a_r h_{ir} h_{ri} + h_{ii}|^2 \rho_i}{|a_r h_{jr} h_{ri} + h_{ji}|^2 \rho_j \frac{N_j}{N_i} + a_r^2 |h_{ri}|^2 \frac{N_r}{N_i} + 1} \right)$$

where $\rho_i = \frac{P_i}{N_i}$ and $j = -i$.

Observation


The achievable individual rates are not always concave.

Time-Sharing Techniques [El Gamal, Mohseni and Zahedi, 2006]

$$R_i^{\text{TS}} \leq \alpha_i (1 - \alpha_j) C \left(\frac{|a_{r,i}^{\text{TS}} h_{ir} h_{ri} + h_{ii}|^2 \rho_i}{\alpha_i [(a_{r,i}^{\text{TS}})^2 |h_{ri}|^2 \frac{N_r}{N_i} + 1]} \right) + \alpha_i \alpha_j C \left(\frac{|a_r^{\text{TS}} h_{ir} h_{ri} + h_{ii}|^2 \alpha_j \rho_i}{\alpha_i [|a_r^{\text{TS}} h_{jr} h_{ri} + h_{ji}|^2 \rho_j \frac{N_j}{N_i} + \alpha_j [(a_r^{\text{TS}})^2 |h_{ri}|^2 \frac{N_r}{N_i} + 1]]} \right)$$


$\forall i \in \{1, 2\}$, where $(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) \in (0, 1)^2$, $a_{r,i}^{\text{TS}} = \sqrt{\frac{P_r / \mu}{|h_{ir}|^2 P_i / \alpha_i + N_r}}$, $a_r^{\text{TS}} = \sqrt{\frac{P_r / \mu}{|h_{1r}|^2 P_1 / \alpha_1 + |h_{2r}|^2 P_2 / \alpha_2 + N_r}}$
 and $\mu = \max\{\alpha_1, \alpha_2\}$ are the relay amplification gains.

Bi-level resolution vs single-level resolution



- With the double resolution strategy, the cost of the additional interference by the relay is significant.


Bi-level resolution vs single-level resolution



Message

- The bi-level resolution compression is better for the "best" receiver if there is a high asymmetry in received SNRs between both receiver nodes.
- With low asymmetry in received SNRs, the single-level resolution compression is preferable to maximize the system sum-rate.

Achievable system sum-rate versus x_r (abscissa for the relay position) with AF, DF and bi-level EF.



Message

- Similar behavior as for the basic relay channel.

Outline of the talk


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Related works

- [Xi & Yeh, 2008]: Traffic game in parallel relay networks with power policy to minimize a certain cost function.
- [Xi & Yeh, 2008]: Quite similar analysis for multi-hop networks.
- [Shi & al., 2008]: Special case of IRCs with the DF protocol without direct links between the sources and destinations.

Outline of the talk


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- Q non-overlapping frequency bands,
- Signal transmitted by S_i in band (q) : $X_i^{(q)}$ with
$$\sum_{q=1}^Q \mathbb{E}|X_i^{(q)}|^2 \leq P_i, \forall i \in \{1, 2\},$$
- $\theta_i^{(q)}$: fraction of power for S_i in band (q) ($\mathbb{E}|X_i^{(q)}|^2 = \theta_i^{(q)} P_i$),
- the channel gains are considered to be static (large scale propagation effects),
- coherent communications assumption for each transmitter-receiver pair,
- single user decoding.

Features and goals

- Each transmitter optimize its transmission rate in a selfish manner,
- a suitable model for this interaction: non-cooperative game,
- Question: do some predictable outcomes exist to this conflict situation?
- → a solution concept to non-cooperative game: **Nash Equilibrium** [Nash, 1950].



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The decode-and-forward case

Features

- Signal transmitted by S_i on band (q) : $X_i^{(q)} = X_{i,0}^{(q)} + \sqrt{\frac{\tau_i^{(q)} \theta_i^{(q)} P_i}{\nu_i^{(q)} P_r^{(q)}}} X_{r,i}^{(q)}$;
- Signal transmitted by \mathcal{R}_i on band (q) : $X_r^{(q)} = X_{r,1}^{(q)} + X_{r,2}^{(q)}$;
- Power allocation policies: $\forall i \in \{1, 2\}$, $\underline{\theta}_i = (\theta_i^{(1)}, \dots, \theta_i^{(Q)})$.

transmission rates

the source-destination pair (S_i, D_i) achieves the transmission rate $\sum_{q=1}^Q R_i^{(q),DF}$ where

$$\begin{cases} R_1^{(q),DF} &= \min \left\{ R_{1,1}^{(q),DF}, R_{1,2}^{(q),DF} \right\} \\ R_2^{(q),DF} &= \min \left\{ R_{2,1}^{(q),DF}, R_{2,2}^{(q),DF} \right\} \end{cases}$$

with

$$\begin{cases} R_{1,1}^{(q),DF} &= C \left(\frac{|h_{1r}^{(q)}|^2 (1-\tau_1^{(q)}) \theta_1^{(q)} P_1}{|h_{2r}^{(q)}|^2 (1-\tau_2^{(q)}) \theta_2^{(q)} P_2 + N_r^{(q)}} \right) \\ R_{1,2}^{(q),DF} &= C \left(\frac{|h_{11}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_1^{(q)} P_1 + |h_{r1}^{(q)}|^2 \nu^{(q)} P_r^{(q)} + 2\text{Re} \left(h_{11}^{(q)} h_{r1}^{(q),*} \right) \sqrt{\tau_1^{(q)} \theta_1^{(q)} P_1 \nu^{(q)} P_r^{(q)}}}{|h_{21}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_2^{(q)} P_2 + |h_{r1}^{(q)}|^2 \nu^{(q)} P_r^{(q)} + 2\text{Re} \left(h_{21}^{(q)} h_{r1}^{(q),*} \right) \sqrt{\tau_2^{(q)} \theta_2^{(q)} P_2 \nu^{(q)} P_r^{(q)} + N_1^{(q)}}} \right) \end{cases}$$

and $(\nu^{(q)}, \tau_1^{(q)}, \tau_2^{(q)})$ is a given triple of parameters in $[0, 1]^3$, $\tau_1^{(q)} + \tau_2^{(q)} \leq 1$.

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The decode-and-forward case

Definition of the game: Non-cooperative strategic form game (SFG)

- 1 **Players:** \mathcal{S}_1 and \mathcal{S}_2 ;
- 2 **Strategy** of \mathcal{S}_i : $\underline{\theta}_i = (\theta_i^{(1)}, \dots, \theta_i^{(Q)})$ in its *strategy set* $\mathcal{A}_i = \left\{ \underline{\theta}_i \in [0, 1]^Q \mid \sum_{q=1}^Q \theta_i^{(q)} \leq 1 \right\}$;
- 3 **Utility function (or payoff)** of \mathcal{S}_i : $u_i^{\text{DF}}(\underline{\theta}_i, \underline{\theta}_{-i}) = \sum_{q=1}^Q R_i^{(q), \text{DF}}(\theta_i^{(q)}, \theta_{-i}^{(q)})$.

Assumption for the game

The game is played once (static game) and is with complete information *i.e.* every player knows the triplet $\mathcal{G}^{\text{DF}} = (\mathcal{K}, (\mathcal{A}_i)_{i \in \mathcal{K}}, (u_i^{\text{DF}})_{i \in \mathcal{K}})$, where $\mathcal{K} = \{1, 2\}$

Definition [Nash Equilibrium]

The state $(\underline{\theta}_i^*, \underline{\theta}_{-i}^*)$ is a pure NE of the SFG \mathcal{G} if $\forall i \in \mathcal{K}, \forall \underline{\theta}_i^f \in \mathcal{A}_i, u_i(\underline{\theta}_i^*, \underline{\theta}_{-i}^*) \geq u_i(\underline{\theta}_i^f, \underline{\theta}_{-i}^*)$.

Theorem [Existence of an NE for the DF protocol]

If the channel gains satisfy the condition $\mathcal{R}e(h_{ii}^{(q)} h_{ii}^{(q)*}) \geq 0$, for all $i \in \{1, 2\}$ and $q \in \{1, \dots, Q\}$ the game defined by $\mathcal{G}^{\text{DF}} = (\mathcal{K}, (\mathcal{A}_i)_{i \in \mathcal{K}}, (u_i^{\text{DF}}(\underline{\theta}_i, \underline{\theta}_{-i}))_{i \in \mathcal{K}})$ with $\mathcal{K} = \{1, 2\}$ and

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The decode-and-forward case

Proof

The proof is based on Theorem 1 of [rosen, 1965]. It states that in game with a finite number of players, if for every player

- 1 the strategy set is convex and compact,
- 2 its utility is continuous in the vector of strategies and
- 3 concave in its own strategy,

then the existence of at least one NE is guaranteed.

Comments

Whatever the values of the channel gains, there exists an NE. Therefore

- The transmitters are able to adapt their PA policies if the number of relay is modified,
- The transmitters are able to adapt their PA policies if the relay location is modified.

The decode-and-forward case

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The proof is based on Theorem 1 of [rosen, 1965]. It states that in game with a finite number of players, if for every player

- 1 the strategy set is convex and compact,
- 2 its utility is continuous in the vector of strategies and
- 3 concave in its own strategy,

then the existence of at least one NE is guaranteed.

Comments

Whatever the values of the channel gains, there exists an NE. Therefore

- The transmitters are able to adapt their PA policies if the number of relay is modified,
- The transmitters are able to adapt their PA policies if the relay location is modified.

The bi-level estimate-and-forward case

Decoding assumption and utility functions

Each receiver implements **single-user decoding** (SUD).

The utility function for \mathcal{S}_i is given by: $u_i^{\text{EF}}(\underline{\theta}_i, \underline{\theta}_{-i}) = \sum_{q=1}^Q R_i^{(q), \text{EF}}$ where, for example,

$$R_1^{(q), \text{EF}} = C \left(\frac{\left(|h_{2r}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_2^{(q)} P_2 + N_r^{(q)} + N_{wz,1}^{(q)} \right) |h_{11}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_1^{(q)} P_1 + \left(|h_{21}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_2^{(q)} P_2 + |h_{r1}^{(q)}|^2 \overline{\nu^{(q)}} P_r^{(q)} + N_1^{(q)} \right) |h_{1r}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_1^{(q)} P_1}{\left(N_r^{(q)} + N_{wz,1}^{(q)} \right) \left(|h_{21}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_2^{(q)} P_2 + |h_{r1}^{(q)}|^2 \overline{\nu^{(q)}} P_r^{(q)} + N_1^{(q)} \right) + |h_{2r}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_2^{(q)} P_2 \left(|h_{r1}^{(q)}|^2 \overline{\nu^{(q)}} P_r^{(q)} + N_1^{(q)} \right)} \right)$$

$$N_{wz,1}^{(q)} = \frac{\left(|h_{11}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_1^{(q)} P_1 + |h_{21}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_2^{(q)} P_2 + |h_{r1}^{(q)}|^2 \overline{\nu^{(q)}} P_r^{(q)} + N_1^{(q)} \right) A^{(q)} - |A_1^{(q)}|^2}{|h_{r1}^{(q)}|^2 \overline{\nu^{(q)}} P_r^{(q)}},$$

$\nu^{(q)} \in [0, 1]$, $A^{(q)} = |h_{1r}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_1^{(q)} P_1 + |h_{2r}^{(q)}|^2 \theta_2^{(q)} P_2 + N_r^{(q)}$ and $A_1^{(q)} = h_{11}^{(q)} h_{1r}^{(q),*} \theta_1^{(q)} P_1 + h_{21}^{(q)} h_{2r}^{(q),*} \theta_2^{(q)} P_2$.

Theorem [Existence of an NE for the bi-level EF protocol]

The game defined by $\mathcal{G}^{\text{EF}} = (\mathcal{K}, (\mathcal{A}_i)_{i \in \mathcal{K}}, (u_i^{\text{EF}}(\underline{\theta}_i, \underline{\theta}_{-i}))_{i \in \mathcal{K}})$ with $\mathcal{K} = \{1, 2\}$ and

$\mathcal{A}_i = \left\{ \underline{\theta}_i \in [0, 1]^Q \mid \sum_{q=1}^Q \theta_i^{(q)} \leq 1 \right\}$, has always at least one pure NE.

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The zero-delay scalar amplify-and-forward case

transmission assumption and utility functions

Each transmitter use **Time-Sharing** techniques.

The utility function for \mathcal{S}_i is given by: $u_i^{\text{AF}}(\underline{\theta}_i, \underline{\theta}_{-i}) = \sum_{q=1}^Q R_i^{(q), \text{AF}}(\theta_i^{(q)}, \theta_{-i}^{(q)})$ where

$$\forall i \in \{1, 2\}, \quad R_i^{(q), \text{AF}} = \alpha_i^{(q)} (1 - \alpha_j^{(q)}) C \left(\frac{|a_{r,i}^{(q)} h_{ir}^{(q)} h_{ri}^{(q)} + h_{ii}^{(q)}|^2 \rho_i \theta_i^{(q)}}{\alpha_i^{(q)} \left[(a_{r,i}^{(q)})^2 |h_{ri}^{(q)}|^2 \frac{N_r^{(q)}}{N_i^{(q)}} + 1 \right]} \right) \\ + \alpha_i^{(q)} \alpha_j^{(q)} C \left(\frac{|a_r^{(q)} h_{ir}^{(q)} h_{ri}^{(q)} + h_{ii}^{(q)}|^2 \alpha_j^{(q)} \rho_j}{\alpha_i^{(q)} \left[|a_r^{(q)} h_{jr} h_{ri} + h_{ji}|^2 \rho_j \theta_j^{(q)} \frac{N_r^{(q)}}{N_i^{(q)}} + \alpha_j^{(q)} \left[(a_r^{(q)})^2 |h_{ri}^{(q)}|^2 \frac{N_r^{(q)}}{N_i^{(q)}} + 1 \right] \right]} \right)$$

with $\forall i \in \{1, 2\}, j = -i$ and $\rho_i^{(q)} = \frac{P_i}{N_i^{(q)}}$, $(\alpha_i^{(q)}, \alpha_j^{(q)}) \in (0, 1)^2$, $a_{r,i}^{(q)} = \tilde{a}_{r,i}^{(q)}(\theta_i^{(q)}) \triangleq \sqrt{\frac{P_r / \mu^{(q)}}{|h_{ir}^{(q)}|^2 P_i / \alpha_i + N_r}}$,

$a_r^{(q)} = \tilde{a}_r^{(q)}(\theta_1^{(q)}, \theta_2^{(q)}) \triangleq \sqrt{\frac{P_r / \mu^{(q)}}{|h_{1r}^{(q)}|^2 P_1 / \alpha_1^{(q)} + |h_{2r}^{(q)}|^2 P_2 / \alpha_2^{(q)} + N_r}}$ and $\mu^{(q)} = \max\{\alpha_1^{(q)}, \alpha_2^{(q)}\}$.

Theorem [Existence of an NE for ZDSAF when $a_r^{(q)} = \tilde{a}_r^{(q)}(\theta_1^{(q)}, \theta_2^{(q)})$]

There exists at least one pure NE in the PA game \mathcal{G}^{AF} .

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There exists at least one pure NE in the PA game \mathcal{G}^{AF} .

The zero-delay scalar amplify-and-forward case: a special case

The special case: parameters

$\alpha_i^{(q)} = 1$, $Q = 2$ and $\forall q \in \{1, 2\}$, $a_r^{(q)} = a_{r,1}^{(q)} = a_{r,2}^{(q)} = A_r^{(q)} \in [0, \tilde{a}_r(1, 1)]$ are constant.

Best Response (BR) functions

$$\text{BR}_i(\theta_j) = \arg \max_{\theta_i} u_i(\theta_i, \theta_j) = \begin{cases} F_i(\theta_j) & \text{if } 0 < F_i(\theta_j) < 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } F_i(\theta_j) \geq 1 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where $j = -i$, $h_{ij} = h_{ij}^{(1)}$, $g_{ij} = h_{ij}^{(2)}$, $F_i(\theta_j) \triangleq -\frac{c_{ij}}{c_{ii}}\theta_j + \frac{d_i}{c_{ii}}$ is an affine function of θ_j ; for

$(i, j) \in \{(1, 2), (2, 1)\}$, $c_{ii} = 2|A_r^{(1)} h_{ri} h_{ir} + h_{ii}^2|A_r^{(2)} g_{ri} g_{ir} + g_{ii}^2| \rho_i$;

$c_{ij} = |A_r^{(1)} h_{ri} h_{ir} + h_{ii}^2|A_r^{(2)} g_{ri} g_{jr} + g_{ji}^2| \rho_j + |A_r^{(1)} h_{ri} h_{jr} + h_{ji}^2|A_r^{(2)} g_{ri} g_{ir} + g_{ii}^2| \rho_j$;

$d_i = |A_r^{(1)} h_{ri} h_{ir} + h_{ii}^2| [A_r^{(2)} g_{ri} g_{ir} + g_{ii}^2| \rho_i + |A_r^{(2)} g_{ri} g_{jr} + g_{ji}^2| \rho_j + A_r^{(2)} |g_{ri}|^2 + 1] - |A_r^{(2)} g_{ri} g_{ir} + g_{ii}^2| A_r^{(1)} |h_{ri}|^2 + 1$.

Theorem [Number of Nash equilibria for ZDSAF]

For the game \mathcal{G}^{AF} with fixed amplification gains at the relays, (i.e., $\frac{\partial a_r}{\partial \theta_i^{(q)}} = 0$), there can be a unique NE, two NE, three NE or an infinite number of NE, depending on the channel parameters (i.e., h_{ij} , g_{ij} , ρ_i , $A_r^{(q)}$, $(i, j) \in \{1, 2, r\}^2$, $q \in \{1, 2\}$).

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
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Simulation: Number of Nash equilibria for the ZDSAF protocol



Message

- Three Nash equilibria, in general.
- The NE point can be predicted from the sole knowledge of the starting point of the game when making use of the Cournot tatonnement.

Example of application: Optimal relay location

Stackelberg formulation

- Introduction of a leader in the game (the network provider for example).
- A bi-level game
- At a first stage: The leader chooses its strategy.
- At a second stage: The remaining players react according to the decision of the leader.

Strategy of the leader

- 2D propagation scenario.
- Strategy: The pair of coordinates $(x_{\mathcal{R}}; y_{\mathcal{R}})$ corresponding to the relay location.
- Utility function:
 - The social welfare $u(x_{\mathcal{R}}, y_{\mathcal{R}}) = u_1[\underline{\theta}^*(x_{\mathcal{R}}, y_{\mathcal{R}})] + u_2[\underline{\theta}^*(x_{\mathcal{R}}, y_{\mathcal{R}})]$;
 - The utility function of one of the users.

Example of application: Optimal relay location


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
Optimal relay location for the ZDSAF protocol with full power regime



Message

- The optimal relay location for the individual rates is one of the segments between S_i and D_i .


Optimal relay location for the ZDSAF protocol with full power regime



Message

- The selfish behavior of the transmitters leads to self-regulating the interference in the network.

Optimal power allocation at the relay for DF and EF



Message

- The relay allocates all its available power to the better receiver.

Conclusion

- Multiband interference relay channels.
- Shannon theory for the IRC.
- Power allocation game for the decentralized multiband IRCs.

Perspectives

- Improve the characterization of NE: analyze the uniqueness issue, for example.
- Consider a more general game.
- Distributed iterative algorithms that converge to NE.

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Questions?