


# ***INPO's Approach to Human Performance in the U.S. Commercial Nuclear Industry***

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**Tony Muschara**

Principal Program Manager – Hu  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations



# *INPO's Mission*

***...to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability — to promote excellence — in the operation of nuclear electric generating plants.***



# ... Nuclear Safety...



## 1. Concentrated Power – reactivity management

- $\lambda$  Reactivity and power level controls
- $\lambda$  Rod control & drive reliability
- $\lambda$  Instrumentation reliability

## 2. Decay Heat Load – inventory and cooling

- $\lambda$  Reactor cavity and fuel pool
- $\lambda$  Secondary plant equipment reliability
- $\lambda$  Safety system reliability and controls
- $\lambda$  Plant materials integrity and design margins

## 3. Radioactive Material – barrier integrity


- $\lambda$  Containment integrity
- $\lambda$  Defect-free fuel
- $\lambda$  Primary systems integrity

# Significant Events – USA




*An event that caused or had the potential to cause:*

- an appreciable reduction in plant safety or reliability*
- excessive radiation exposure or the discharge of radioactivity off site or*
- serious harm to individuals*



# Error Rate Reduction



# Hazard – Barrier – Asset




**Hazard:**  
Human – “touching”

**Barrier(s):**  
Less than Adequate  
or Missing

**Asset:**  
Object to Protect



error



event

# *What is Managed?*



- $\lambda$  Assets: people, plant, and property
- $\lambda$  Hazard: human error
- $\lambda$  Exposure: “People *touching* equipment”
- $\lambda$  Risk: probability and consequences
- $\lambda$  Event: ▼ frequency and ▼ severity
- $\lambda$  Controls:
  - $\lambda$  **error rate** (frequency) → reduce active errors
  - $\lambda$  **defense-in-depth** (severity) → reduce latent conditions

# Strategic Approach to Hu



$$R_e + M_d \rightarrow \emptyset E$$

*Reducing  
error*

*and*

*Managing  
defenses*

*leads  
to*

**ZERO  
Events**




Identify  
Analyze  
Correct





# Anatomy of an Event



# Performance Model



# *Risk-based Approach\**




- $\lambda$  Human unreliability and equipment risk can not be managed the same.
- $\lambda$  Process of assigning controls for human work activities uses a *graded approach*.
- $\lambda$  Controls are *proportionate* to the risk or potential consequence.

\* IAEA, *Management of Operational Safety in Nuclear Power Plants* – a report by the International Safety Advisory Group, final draft, 1999.

# ***Work Execution***

***“touching” the plant***



## $\lambda$ **Work Preparation**

- $\lambda$  planning, walkdowns, task assignments and pre-job briefings

## $\lambda$ **Work Performance**

- $\lambda$  uneasiness (wariness), situation awareness, Hu tools, teamwork and supervision

## $\lambda$ **Work Feedback**

- $\lambda$  reporting and observations

# Critical Step



**Critical Step** – a procedure step, series of steps, or action that if done improperly *will* cause (*immediate*) *irreversible harm* to equipment or people, or significantly impact plant operation



# Defenses



## λ Engineered Controls

- λ equipment reliability, software & hardware configuration, human-machine interface

## λ Administrative Controls

- λ procedures, training, processes, policies, expectations and standards

## λ Cultural Controls


- λ assumptions, values, beliefs, attitudes, work group norms, and leadership

## λ Oversight Controls

- λ accountability, performance improvement

# *Managing Defenses*

**$M_d$**



- 1. Identify** unsafe condition(s)
- 2. Analyze** its cause(s) and extent of condition
- 3. Correct** the condition(s)

# *Organizational Factors*



1. Mission
2. Organizational structure
3. Clear direction
4. Work management
5. Administrative controls
6. Hazard control processes
7. Training & qualification
8. Engineering processes

9. Performance improvement processes
10. Technology
11. Human resources
12. Conservative decision making
13. Communication
14. Managerial/supervisory practices




# *Safety Culture Principles\**



1. Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety.
2. Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety.
3. Trust permeates the organization.
4. Decision-making reflects safety first.
5. Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique.
6. A questioning attitude is cultivated.
7. Organizational learning is embraced.
8. Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination.

\* INPO, *Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture*, November 2004.

# INPO Performance Improvement Model



# OR.3 Human Performance



“Station personnel select and apply appropriate error prevention techniques commensurate with the importance of assigned tasks to minimize the frequency and consequences of events.”

λ Organizational Factors

λ Job-Site Conditions

λ Individual Behaviors

**$R_e$**

**$M_d$**

# Strategic Approach to Hu



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Identify  
Analyze  
Correct

