# **Changes in Arc Flash-2018**



## Agenda

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# IEEE-1584 review and meeting update DC

Expected Date of new Standard

#### Standards Changes

- **70E**
- $\circ$  NEC
- Electrical Safety Workshop (ESW)
   Statistics Analysis

## **IEEE-1584 Review and Meeting Update**

## Theory in Practice

Turn of the Century

#### • IEEE-1584 was born in early 2000's

- Decided on wide range of currents and voltages
- Raised ~\$75,000 in funding
- Used 20 cubic inch box
- Tested MCC's using a smaller size box
- Testing facilities Square D in Cedar Rapids & Ontario Hydro in Toronto
- Bussmann played a big roll as well

#### Navy got involved

- Wanted to see how an arc flash would damage ship
- Built a 15' cube
- Obtained funding for 13.8kV testing
- Completed document went through a robust approval process
  - ° Three rounds of 100s of questions
  - Approved June 2002 (2 year cycle)

IEEE 1584-2002

Developing the 2002 Revision

- Based on the results of > 300 arc flash tests
- Four calculation criteria:
  - 1. Systems less than 1000 V
  - 2. Systems from 1000 to 15,000 V
  - 3. Incident energy (cal/cm<sup>2</sup>)
  - 4. Flash hazard boundary (AKA arc flash boundary)

#### • 85% rule

Slow burn vs. Rapid Energy Release

## • 125kVA transformer rule

° Based on data, would not sustain an arc

#### • 2-second rule

Would leave the arc with-in two seconds

Revision Process Begins

#### Questions immediately arose

- 1. What if the electrodes were horizontal instead of vertical?
- 2. What about difference size enclosures?
- 3. What about DC arc flash?

# PCIC established a collaboration committee between IEEE and NFPA

- ° 6.5 Million Requested
- ° 3.5 Million Received
- Recommended 10-year Project Authorization Request (PAR)
- PAR extension was granted until 12/31/17

1700 Tests Conducted

Voltage	~ Number of tests			
208V (3ph) 240V (1ph)	195			
480V	400			
600V	340			
2700V	320			
4160V	180			
14.3kV	270			





### Study Complexity

• New standard makes modeling more complex

#### Proposed variables

- Configurations (VCB, VCBB, HCB, VOA, HOA)
- V<sub>oc</sub>
- l<sub>bf</sub>
- Working Distance
- Duration (Breaker or fuse curve)
- Gap
- Enclosure Size
  - Box Size & Gap defaults to conservative NEMA size and gap distance

Test Configurations The 1584 Committee decided to conduct tests using five configurations

- VCB Vertical electrodes in a Cubic Box (IEEE 2002)
  Load side of BKR
- VCBB Vertical electrodes in a Cubic Box
  - terminated in a "Barrier"
    - line side of BKR
- VOA Vertical electrodes in Open Air (IEEE 2002)
- HOA Horizontal electrodes in Open Air
- HCB Horizontal electrodes in a Cubic Box
  - Busbar
  - HCBB was considered but HCB was considered worst case

### Comparison of Results



#### **Other Parameters**

#### • Blast Pressure

Injury potential based on fault level
Slow burn vs. Rapid Energy Release

#### Sound Pressure

- Risk of severe hearing damage
- Tests at 4,160 volts have produced sound levels upwards of 160 dB at distances of more than 3-meters

## • Light

- Bright summer day is 100,000 lux (light intensity)
  - I lux= 1 lumen per square metre squared
- Tens of millions of lux have been measured during arc flash testing

#### • Enclosure Size (now a variable)

Based on standard NEMA sizes

## Study Complexity

# Standard practices taken out

#### • 125kVA Rule will not be in the new text

 Instead a proposal was made – "No tests were done at 208V and less than 2500A, therefore should not be considered."

#### • 85% rule will not be in new text

 Statistical deviation was such that confidence in formulas

° So no need to have this rule

• 2 second rule will not be in new text

## IEEE 1584 and 1584.1

#### Two Documents

IEEE Std 1584™-2002

#### IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations

Sponsor

Petroleum and Chemical Industry Committee of the Industry Applications Society

Abstract: This guide provides techniques for designers and facility operators to apply in determining the arc-flash hazard distance and the incident energy to which employees could be exposed during their work on or near electrical equipment.

Keywords: arc fault currents, arc-flash hazard, arc-flash hazard analysis, arc-flash hazard marking, arc in enclosures, arc in open air, bolted fault currents, electrical hazard, flash protection boundary, incident energy, personal protective equipment, protective device coordination study, short-circuit study, working distances

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No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, in an electronic retrieval system or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. IEEE Guide for the Specification of Scope and Deliverable Requirements for an Arc-Flash Hazard Calculation Study in Accordance with IEEE Std 1584™ IEEE Industry Applications Society Sponsored by the Petroleum and Chemical Industry Committee IFFF IEEE Std 1584.1™-2013 3 Park Avenue New York, NY 10016-5997 LISA

IEEE

**IEEE STANDARDS ASSOCIATION** 

IEEE-1584-2018 Technical Information IEEE-1584.1-2018 Deliverable Requirements So What Does This Mean to Me?

#### • Design Engineers / Owners

Arc flash analysis per 1584.1 Engineers to collect data?

#### • Study Engineers

Consistency within your own group
Plan the data collection

#### • Manufacturers

 Make data visible so we can collect it without taking energized equipment apart

## **Direct Current**



Two landmark technical papers changed the understanding of DC arc flash

#### • Used same methodology as AC for now

- "Arc Flash Calculations of Exposures to DC Systems" Doan, D.R., IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications, Vol. 46 No.6.
  - Equations included in the informative annex of the 2012 Edition of NFPA 70E and remain in Annex D of the 2015 edition
  - Helped elevate the discussion of DC arc flash calculations

 "DC Arc Models and Incident-Energy Calculations," R.F. Ammerman, T. Gammon, J.P. Nelson and P.K. Sen, IEEE Transactions on industry Applications, Vol. 46, No. 5
 Introduced Gap variable



## DC Arc Flash Formula in 70E

## $I_{arc}=0.5*I_{bf}$ $IE_{M}=0.01*V_{sys}*I_{arc}*T_{arc}/D^{2}$

Where:

 $IE_m$  = Estimated DC arc flash incident energy at the maximum power point – *cal/cm*<sup>2</sup>

- I<sub>arc</sub> = Arcing current Amps
- I<sub>bf</sub> = System bolted fault current Amps
- V<sub>svs</sub> = System voltage *Volts*
- T<sub>arc</sub> = Arcing time Seconds
- D = Working distance *cm*
- Assume that the maximum available short-circuit current is 10\* the 1 minute ampere rating
- "For exposures where the arc is in a box or enclosure, it would be prudent to consider additional PPE protection beyond the values shown in Table 130.7(C)(15)(b)"



### DC Arc Flash

• DOE Funding 3-yr DC arc flash research with EPRI and Sandia Labs

Sent out DC arc flash problem with same variables
 Got back results anywhere between 7-124 cal/cm<sup>2</sup>

Any Documented Cases DC arc flash burns?
 Not Many



### DC Arc Flash

#### • Preliminary model shows promise

- Testing shows that consistent arcs can be reproduced.
- Need more testing to verify model

#### • Preliminary results

- Is arc sustainable? Yes- However, depends on inductance in circuit
- Current formulas including 70E seems conservative
- Current-Energy remains constant
- Arcs vs. Arc Flash



## DC Hazards for Batteries

• New Research on Hazards of DC • Chemical Lead Acid Shock • Arc Flash • Thermal • Poisonous Gas Hydrogen

## NFPA-70E & NEC

NFPA-70E 2018

#### **Global Changes**

#### • New Terminology – Replaced

- "accident" with "incident"
- "accidental" with "unintentional"
- "accidentally" with "unintentionally"
- "short circuit current" with "available fault current"

- Reduced DC threshold from 100vdc to 50vdc
  - Aligns with OSHA CFR 1910.303 50vdc
  - NFPA 70E Table 130.4(D)(b)- DC shock boundaries

## NFPA 70E



#### • Tenth Edition 2015

Emphasis on risk

From arc flash hazard analysis to arc flash risk assessment

- Prohibited approach deleted
- Category 0 removed from PPE table
- Electrical Safety Program to include maintenance conditions
- Arc flash label to include IE or table category BUT NOT BOTH

#### • Eleventh Edition 2018

- Aligned LOTO with OSHA 1910.147
- Electrical Safety Program to include
  - Inspection
  - Human factor/Human error
  - Incident Investigation
  - Job Planning
  - Risk Assessment Procedure
  - Hierarchy of risk controls
- Removal 40cal/cm2 reference

## 70E - 105.3

#### Responsibilities

#### A. Employer Responsibility

- 1. Establish, document, and implement practices and procedures
  - MOPs, SOPs, PPE, etc
- 2. Provided employees with training in practices and procedures
  - On-the-Job, Classroom

#### **B. Employee Responsibility**

 Shall comply with the practices and procedures provided by the employer

## The Arc-Flash Hazard Warning Label

The Final Product...



#### Arc Flash and Shock Hazard Appropriate PPE Required

Arc Flash Hazard Boundary	5 ft 5 in
Working Distance	1 ft 6 in
Shock Hazard Exposure	480 VAC
Glove Class	00
Limited Approach	3 ft 6 in
Restricted Approach	1 ft

Equipment ID: ATS-CH1

Hood-Patterson & Dewar, Inc



## WARNING

#### Arc Flash and Shock Hazard Appropriate PPE Required

Incident Energy in cal/cm^2	1.2	Hill Brands PPE Level		
Arc Flash Hazard Boundary Working Distance	1 ft 6 in 1 ft 6 in	1		
Shock Hazard Exposure	208 VAC			
Glove Class	00	PPE Requirements		
Limited Approach	3 ft 6 in	Natural Fiber Shirt, Pants, and Safety		
Restricted Approach Avc	oid Contact	Glasses		
Equipment ID: PANEL A Date: 02/13/16				
Hood Patterson & Dewar		hoodpd.com   850 Center Way, Norcross, GA 30071		

NFPA -70E 2018

Changes

#### • 40 cal/cm2 Restriction Removed

- 130.7 (A) Informational Note 3 removed from 2018 version
  - Used to warn that "greater emphasis may be necessary with respect to de-energizing" equipment that exceeds 40 cal/cm2

A DANGER					
NO SAFE PPE EXISTS					
ENERGIZED WORK PROHIBITED					
153 in 40 cal/cm^2	Flash Risk Boundary Flash Risk at 18 in				
PPE	DO NOT WORK ON LIVE!				
480 VAC 00 42 in 12 in N/A	Shock Risk when cover is removed Glove Class Limited Approach Restricted Approach Minimum Arc Rating				
Location:	110GCBJ				

## NFPA -70E 2018

# Is it required that I relabel my facility?

#### 130.5(H) Exception 1

• "....Labels applied prior to the effective date of this edition (2018) shall be acceptable if they complied with the requirements for equipment labels in the standard in effect at the time the labels were applied." Electrical Safety Program (ESP)

Risk Assessment Procedure

(Performed before work is started)

### Identify hazards

- Assess risks
- Implement risk control according to a hierarchy of methods
  - Elimination
  - Substitution
  - Engineering controls
  - ° Awareness
  - Administrative controls
  - PPE



## NFPA 70E 2018

Risk Assessment Terminology

#### • Hazard

- Source of harm injury, damage or death
- Risk
  - Combination of the <u>likelihood</u> of harm occurring and the <u>severity</u> of that harm
- Risk Assessment
  - A process of hazard identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation

NFPA 70E 2018 Example

What is a Risk Assessment for Shock?

## Likelihood of making electrical contact

- Is electrical contact possible when crossing the restricted approach?
  - Not: Can the worker be careful enough to avoid the electrical shock?

#### • Severity of harm

 Could electrical contact result in harm (e.g. burns, loss of body parts, or death)?

 Not: It's ok since I've been shocked before with no lasting effect

## Hierarchy of Controls

#### 1. Elimination-

• Physically removing the hazard – TURN IT OFF

#### 2. Substitution-

 Replace with non-hazard equipment – ARC-RESISTANT SWITCHGEAR

#### 3. Engineering controls-

○ Isolate workers from hazard – REMOTE RACKING DEVICE



## Hierarchy of Controls

#### 4. Warning/Awareness

 Making workers award of hazards and risks – SIGNS, WARNING LIGHTS

#### 5. Administrative Controls

 Standardize the way to perform task – DEVELOP POLICIES, TRAINING

#### 6. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Reduces the effects in attempt to make injury survivable –
 AR CLOTHING, SAFETY GLASSES etc.



## Hierarchy of Controls

#### **IV AWARENESS**



## NOT ONLY WILL THIS KILL YOU, IT WILL HURT THE WHOLE TIME YOU ARE DYING

NFPA 70E 2018

Safety Planning 110.1(I)

#### I. Job Safety Planning and Job Briefing

#### 1. Job Safety Planning

- 1. Be completed by a qualified person
- 2. Be documented
- 3. Include the following information
  - a) Job and task description
  - b) Identify hazards
  - c) Shock assessment
  - d) Arc flash assessment
  - e) Work procedures, special precautions, and energy source controls
- 2. Job Briefing Shall cover the job safety plan
- 3. Change in Scope Additional planning to occur if changes occur

## NFPA 70E 2018

Article 120: Lockout/Tagout  Additions to 120.5 (7) regarding "adequately rated" portable test instruments

- Exception 1 added to allow operators to use permanently installed meters rather than handheld meters to test conductors and circuit parts
- Exception 2 added to allow non-contact test instruments for electrical systems over 1000V

NEC 2017 (NFPA 70) Article 240.87

Arc Flash Reduction



- Where installed overcurrent device is rated or adjustable to a continuous current trip setting of 1200 A or higher, 240.87 A and B apply
  - A. Circuit breaker location must be documented and available to authorized personnel
  - B. Methods to reduce clearing time:
    - 1. Zone-selective interlocking (ZSI)
    - 2. Differential relaying
    - 3. Energy-reducing maintenance switching with local status indicator
    - 4. Energy-reducing arc flash mitigation system
    - 5. <u>An instantaneous trip setting that is less than the</u> <u>available arcing current</u>
    - 6. <u>An instantaneous override that is less than the</u> <u>available arcing current</u>
    - 7. An approved equivalent means

## **Stastistics**

## Electrical Fatalities since the 1990s

Workplace fatalities declined 41%



## **Electrical Shocks**

#### By the Numbers

#### • Nearly 6000 fatalities from 1992-2012

- 98% involve electrocutions
- About 40% involve voltages under 600V
- About 40% involve overhead power line contact

## Fatalities Between 2011 and 2015

ESW 2018-39-Reframing our view of workplace electrical injuries

#### FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES

2011-2015 Occupational Fatalities by Event/Type

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Total Occupational Fatalities	4,693	4,628	4,585	4,821	4,836	23,563
Type of Event of Exposure						-
Transportation Incidents	1,937	1,923	1,865	1,984	2,054	9,763
Slips, Trips, and Falls	681	704	724	818	800	3,727
Violence/Injuries by Persons/Animals	791	603	773	765	703	3,635
Contact with Objects and Equipment	710	723	721	715	722	3,591
Exposure to Electricity	174	156	141	154	134	759
Fire or Explosion	144	122	149	137	121	673

Electrical Fatalities Between 2011 and 2015

ESW 2018-39-Reframing our view of workplace electrical injuries



Non-Electrical Fatalities Between 2011 and 2015

ESW 2018-39-Reframing our view of workplace electrical injuries



## **Thank You**

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