



## Market Coupling

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
12 December 2013

- Day-ahead Auction
  - EPEX Day-ahead products
  - Determining Day-ahead Market results
- Market Coupling (MC)
  - How does it works?
  - Overview of the EU MC development
  - Impact assessment
  - Impact assessment examples

- Day ahead Auction
  - EPEX Day ahead products
  - Determining Prices and Volumes
- Market Coupling (MC)

Day-Ahead Auction	
Market Areas	France
	Germany/Austria
	Switzerland
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Blind auction, 7/7 days</li> <li>• 24 hours of the next day</li> <li>• Hours and blocks of hours</li> <li>• Trading via EPEX Trading System – ETS</li> <li>• Web based electronic system</li> </ul>	

Gate closure time



Publication of Market results




- **Each participant can submit hourly and/or block orders**
  - **Supply and Demand Hourly orders**
    - They take the forms of a piecewise linear curve for a given hour
    - For **each price**, the participant indicates the **volume** to buy/sell
    - These curves are aggregated into a single supply and a single demand curves for each hour
  - **Supply and Demand Block orders**
    - They are defined by **volumes** on several hours and **one price limit**
    - They express the willingness of the participant to be either fully accepted on all hours or totally rejected
- Day ahead Auction
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- **Day-ahead Market results**
  - MCP: Market Clearing Price for each hour
  - MCV: Market Clearing Volume for each hour
- **Supply and Demand Hourly orders**
  - Orders in-the-money are fully accepted
    - Supply at price < MCP
    - Demand at price > MCP
  - Orders out-of-the-money are fully rejected
    - Supply at price > Market Clearing Price (MCP)
    - Demand at price < Market Clearing Price (MCP)
  - Orders at-the-money can be curtailed
- **Supply and Demand Block orders**
  - Block orders that are accepted are in-the-money
    - Weighted average of the published MCPs is above limit price for a supply block
    - Weighted average of the published MCPs is below limit price for a demand block
  - Block orders in-the-money can be rejected (Paradoxically rejected Block PRB)
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## Determining Day-ahead Market results (2)

- Algorithm optimizing the WELFARE
  - The algorithm search for a partition of executed block orders optimizing the welfare,
  - For each hour, the executed supply (resp. demand) block order volumes are added to the supply( resp. demand) curve,
  - Price and volume are determined by the intersection of the aggregated demand and supply curves.


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
## How does it work?

- Several market areas with a PX of their own
- Goal of Market Coupling is the optimal use of cross border capacities (ATCs) provided by TSOs
- The ATC at the interconnections are used in an optimal way by implicit allocation of electricity and capacities over the exchange
  - The access to the market becomes easier and fairer
  - The realisation of transactions become more efficient
  - Less price volatility
  - Prices converge over the market areas when sufficient cross-border capacity is available

- **Day-ahead Auction**
- **Market Coupling (MC)**
  - How does it work?
  - Overview of the EU MC development
  - Impact assessment axes
  - Impact assessment examples




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    - Initiatives
    - Coupling achievements
    - Algorithm achievements
  - Impact assessment axes
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# Coupling achievements

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2006

- POWERNEXT co-initiator of TLC
- 3 PXs, 3 TSOs involved

2009

- EEX and POWERNEXT Spot business under one roof
- Geographically including AU, CH, DE and FR

2010


- Continued regional coupling (CWE)
- 3 PXs, 7 TSOs involved
- Coordinated with Nordic (ITVC)
- Cooperation EPEX-HUPX

2011

- HU+CZ+SK coupling
- 3 PXs, 3 TSOs involved
- Cooperation
  - EPEX
  - HUPX
  - OKTE
  - OTE

# Algorithm achievements

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**Design and assessment of the TLC MC algorithm**

- TLC dedicated

**Design and assessment of the CWE MC algorithm : COSMOS**

- “Generic”
  - ATC/FB/FBI/Hybrid MC
  - Loss/tariff/ramping
  - Smart blocks
  - Negative prices...
- “Unlimited” (nb of markets)
- Welfare optimization

**Design and assessment of the PCR algorithm : EUPHEMIA**

- Based on CWE algorithm
- SWE (ES+PT) markets
- CSE (IT) markets
- Flow calculation
- ...

- TLC algorithm

- Greedy algorithm

<http://static.epexspot.com/document/4360/Algorithme%20du%20TLC>

- COSMOS algorithm

- Branch and Bound algorithm

[http://static.epexspot.com/document/20015/COSMOS\\_public\\_description.pdf](http://static.epexspot.com/document/20015/COSMOS_public_description.pdf)


- EUPHEMIA algorithm

- Heuristic algorithm combining B&B and Heuristics

<http://static.epexspot.com/document/24867/Euphemia%20-%20public%20description%20-%20Nov%202013>

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- New market development (BE)
- Shift from Explicit to Implicit auction mechanism
- MC impact on Market results and algorithm performance

- Algorithms comparison on a given scope
- Negative prices development
- Network model development  
ATC vs FB vs FBI
- MC extension (CWE+NPS+UK+...)
- Volume coupling vs Price coupling
- ...

- New product development
  - OMIE & GME products
- New products introduction  
Smart blocks on EPEX
- MC extension  
CWE → NWE → PCR
- Network model development
  - Tariff / losses on interconnectors
  - Flow calculation
- ...

- Market result indicators
  - Welfare
  - Price (volatility, resilience, convergence...)
  - Volume
  - Block order
  - ...
- Performance indicators
  - Calculation time
  - Solution quality (optimality)
  - ...
- Same indicators for different purposes
  - Day-ahead Auction
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    - Impact assessment
      - What ?
      - How ?
    - Impact assessment examples
      - Market development
      - Algorithm development

- Data

- Historical data (order books, ATC, nominations...) collection
- « Automated » tools to collect data
- More than «30 years» of data depending on the purpose
- ... Data sharing agreements

- Hardware/DB

Increasing number of production like environments with the development of MC projects

- Simulation software **embedding the MC algorithms**

- CWE SF: web shared tool (CWE TSOs/PXs)
- Pieces of home made software automating “exotic” simulations

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    - How ?
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# Replacing EXPLICIT by IMPLICIT allocation mechanism

- **CWE vs TLC + DE**
    - No more cross border arbitrage opportunities on DE borders
    - No more arbitrage orders in the order books
  - **It was questionable**
    - In which extent the participant behavior will change?
    - Whether arbitrage orders are present in the orders books ?
    - What is the portion of arbitrage orders in the order books ?
  - **Simulating shift from EXPLICIT to IMPLICIT**
    - 2 methodologies
      - Altering the ATC with the cross border nominations for the interconnectors that were allocated explicitly (DE-FR and DE-NL)
      - Removing arbitrage orders from the respective order books (DE, FR and NL)
    - For both methodologies, consider different levels of alteration resulting from different assumptions of the arbitrage orders portion in the order books
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[http://static.epexspot.com/document/4775/CWE\\_MC\\_Implementation\\_Study.pdf](http://static.epexspot.com/document/4775/CWE_MC_Implementation_Study.pdf)

- CWE PXs decided allowing negative prices on their markets for CWE MC launch
- It was questionable
  - In which extent the participant behavior will change?
    - Will order prices shift to (very) negative values ?
    - Will all “price taking orders” remain ?
  - What is the impact of harmonized and non harmonized price limits ?
  - ...
- Simulating Negative price development
  - Focus on delivery days where curtailment situations occurred at minimal price
  - Replace a portion of (sell) orders submitted at minimal price by orders at -3000€
  - Assume different portion of negative price orders
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- Smart blocks
  - LINKED blocks
    - Regular block execution conditions
    - + Execution dependency
      - father / child hierarchy
      - child can be executed only if his father is executed
  - EXCLUSIVE group of blocks
    - + Regular block execution conditions
    - + Execution condition
      - Only one block of the exclusive group can be executed
- It is questionable
  - How will participant behavior change?
  - What will be the portion of SB in the portfolios ?
  - What will be the additional complexity (combined with NWE launch)
- Simulations of smart blocks on CWE MC in NWE configuration
  - ⇒ Assuming different behaviors and different portions
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- TLC vs COSMOS
  - COSMOS vs ETS Matching Algorithm
  - COSMOS vs ITVC (EMCC)
    - Initial validation → Initial benchmark
    - Each time one of the algorithms is changed/updated
      - Validation against the benchmark
  - COSMOS vs EUPHEMIA
    - COSMOS vs EUPHEMIA on CWE scope under ATC/FB/FBI Market Coupling
  - ...
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# Questions?

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